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ABSTRACT
Rapidly changing demands on workers and their skills have thrust
issues of vocational education and training to the fore in
political debate. This thesis focuses on public policies
emerging from this debate as they affect a particular group in
the population, namely young people leaving school and looking
for work. At a theoretical level, the thesis is designed to
promote an understanding of the key dimensions of public policy
for the transition from school to work. Empirically, the thesis
uses comparative analysis first of all to explain Britain's
failure adequately to train young workers in the 1980s, and
secondly to draw lessons for policy development in the 1990s.
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INTRODUCTION
Public policy paradoxes are a blight for decision-makers, but a
blessing for graduate students, as they often involve puzzling
policy failure, and are therefore ripe for study. Government
policies affecting the transition of young people from school to
work in Britain and the United States seem to present such a
paradox'. For twenty years or so after 1960, British and
American public policy in this field displayed important
similarities, and by the early 1980s, it was clear that the
skills of workers in both countries were seriously deficient in
comparison to their major competitors. It was widely
acknowledged that these inadequacies were central to economic
failure, and on the basis of foreign (primarily West German)
experience, British policy has been gradually remolded by
successive administrations under Mrs Thatcher. At the end of
the 1980s, however, the paradox is that despite the reforms of
the last ten years, Britain's training system continues to
produce underskilled workers. This thesis is an examination of
why this should be, and what can be done about it. We will use
evidence from thirty years of international experience to draw
lessons for the place and content of youth policy in the 1990s.
I One small, methodological point is noteworthy here.
Throughout the text, I refer to 'Britain' and not the 'United
Kingdom': this is because analysis of the situation in Northern
Ireland requires separate study
1
The thesis uses theoretical considerations and case by case
description to build a framework with which to understand
policies for youth vocational education and training (VET). The
primary focus is on national level government policy (as
expressed in legislative acts and regulations) and its
subsequent impact on aggregate indicators of how an age cohort
is making the transition from school to work. This is not to
belittle the importance of initiatives in local government, but
rather an acknowledgement of the national ambit of manpower
planning. Nor should the focus on national public policy be
taken to imply that the activities of the private and voluntary
sectors are unimportant for VET provision - as we will see, the
interaction between public interest, as expressed in government
policy, and private endeavour is crucial to youth policy.
The thesis covers the period from the early 1960s to the present
day, and therefore includes analysis of policy-making during the
relatively calm economic times at the end of the long post war
boom, as well as during and after the oil shocks of 1973 and
1979 that crystallized latent sources of instability in the
economic system. In the field of youth policy, the countries
under consideration all faced two major problems in both the
good and bad economic times: first, how to cope with unusually
large cohorts of young people leaving school for work; second,
how to prepare economies and workers for the challenges of
increasing global competition in the dawning technological age.
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The thesis suggests that government answers to these questions
are revealed in two key indices: first, whether or not policy
for youth VET forms one part of a broader economic strategy; and
secondly, the role of the market (specifically the atomistic
decisions of individual firms) in deciding the content of
training policy. Based on careful counterposition of British,
North American, West German and Swedish experience, three claims
are made. First, that policy for youth VET can only contribute
to improved economic competitiveness when it is fully integrated
with related policy areas. Second, that the paradox of British
experience in the 1980s - when policy for youth VET did form
part of a larger strategy but failed significantly to improve
skill levels - reveals the fundamental weakness of the free
market as a provider of suitable training provision. Finally,
it is claimed that to be successful, policy-making must take
account of the peculiarities of the national political and
economic context.
The potential pitfalls of a comparative approach to public
policy analysis are serious. Most obviously, two problems stand
out: first, the political response of different countries to
common problems is shaped by distinctive histories, institutions
and cultures; secondly, policy for the transition from school to
work must fit the specific contours of labor market structure in
each country, and is therefore country-specific by necessity.
At the same time, the range of policy options open to countries
3
facing similar economic circumstances is limited, and the gains
from judicious comparative analysis are enormous. Most
importantly, theories can be tested in different contexts,
simultaneously revealing their general applicability and
illuminating the influence of nation-specific factors on policy
outputs.
The approach taken here involves the use of 'case studies' to
illuminate different aspects of school to work policy . These
studies are centered around the 'critical case' of policy
development in Britain over the last thirty years. The British
case is important because the initiatives undertaken by Mrs
Thatcher represent a controlled experiment in neo-liberal,
market-oriented youth policy. However, to strengthen our claims
for policy prescription, consideration is also given to policies
pursued in the other countries. The American example is used
to gain perspective on the shift in British policy in the 1980s3,
2 An alternative approach to comparative politics involves the
use of regression analysis. This approach is not used here for
three reasons: first, as we will discover, there is no one
dependent variable in youth VET policy; second, at the aggregate
level at which figures are compiled, countries are too different
to produce worthwhile correlations; finally, my concern with
government strategy for youth VET policy, as well as the content
of policy, makes it very hard to produce a useful one dimensional
scale on which to place different countries
3 As Studlar notes, one might have expected British and
American policy to converge in the 1980s, given the two countries'
similar long term economic problems and the conservative resurgence
in both countries in the late 1970s, culminating in the elections
of 1979 and 1980. See D.T.Studlar 'Introduction: Policy
Convergence? Political Economy in the US and UK' pp 3-10 in
D.T.Studlar and J.L.Waltman Political Economy: Public Policies in
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while the West German and Swedish cases illustrate the regulated
alternatives to the North American and British brands of
voluntarism. Detailed analysis of the Japanese case has been
put to one side, in large part because public policy now plays
a relatively minor role in the system, testimony to the
resilience of existing structures for the induction of young
workers into the labor force.
The structure of the thesis is quite straightforward. Chapter
one provides the theoretical backbone for subsequent discussion;
chapter two outlines three tracks along which public policy has
proceeded in the post war period; finally, chapter 3 draws
lessons for policy development.
thel unitea bates and Britain (Jackson: University Press of
Mississippi), 1987)
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Chapter 
SKILLS AND SCHOOL LEAVERS
A confusing multitude of government policies have been pursued
under the umbrella title of 'VET' over the last thirty years,
driven by many different objectives, and aimed at various groups
in the population. Any useful examination of public policy in
this field must therefore be based on a clear understanding of
the intention of the policy, and the target group at which it is
aimed. Following a brief review of possible objectives, target
groups and policies, this chapter isolates one set of objectives
(improved economic competitiveness), one target group (school
leavers) and one group of policies (vocational education and
training) as the subjects for this study. On this basis, we
then proceed to develop a working typology of policy for youth
VET which will be helpful to our examination of the policies
pursued in the different countries.
The multiple objectives that can be served through policy for
VET include the improvement of economic competitiveness, an
increase in welfare payments to the poor, and the diminution of
alienation resulting from unemployment. VET helps economic
competitiveness through the productivity gains that seem to
result from improved skill and education of workers. These
issues are discussed in more detail below. However, policies
falling within the VET rubric have also been used to serve more
of a social welfare function, either as a channel for income
6
support with the aim of combatting poverty, or as a means to
preserve social stability by offering work-related tasks to the
unemployed. For instance, in times of recession, political
pressure can force governments to take some action on behalf of
the unemployed, and work experience schemes offer one way to
divert resources to the disadvantaged. It has also been argued
that these schemes are used as insurance against riots and urban
disorder: it is claimed that programs in the 'war on poverty' in
the US aimed to defuse tension in the inner cities, and it has
been suggested that the development of the Youth Training Scheme
in Britain was at least in part a response to the riots in
Liverpool and London in the summer of 19814. These latter
objectives will not, however, be of primary concern in this
thesis, which concentrates on policies designed to improve
economic performance.
Policy for VET obviously cannot be applied to the population
indiscriminately. Different groups of people have different
requirements, and it is therefore necessary to disaggregate the
workforce for policy purposes. Two obvious lines of demarcation
are employment situation and age. Just as the unemployed have
different immediate needs from the employed, so younger people
4 The classic statement of this case with regard to the
American scene is F.Fox Piven and R.Cloward Regulating the Poor:
The Functions of Public Welfare (New York: Pantheon, 1971). On
the origins of YTS, see for instance D.Finn Training Without Jobs:
New Deals and Broken Promises (Basingstoke: MacMillan, 1987) pp
141/2
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need to be offered different sorts of help from older people.
This thesis focuses on a particular group of young people,
namely those leaving school between the ages of 16 and 18 with
the intention of finding work. The notion that these young
people are undergoing a "transition" from school to work focuses
attention on a veritable leap required of them - a leap from
dependency to productivity. Over the last thirty years, often
spurred by competitive pressure and labor market failures,
government policies have increasingly recognized the special
needs of this group of people, and policies for youth vocational
education and training have sought to smooth their transition
into the labor force.
The policies under scrutiny in this thesis flow directly from
our dual interest in economic competitiveness and the young
unemployed: they involve changes to the High School curriculum,
and vocational training between school and work. Thus, policies
for job creation through public works are not covered in any
detail here, on the grounds that they make little contribution
to improving the skill levels of the workers involved.
Similarly, short term remedies for youth unemployment that seek
5 Prais makes the useful point that while seven year
apprenticeships from age 14-21 offered young people time to adapt
to their new status, the raising of the school leaving age and the
lowering of the voting age have cut to two years (16-18) the time
for transition from dependency to full legal independence. See
S.J.Prais 'Comment on Chapter 5' pp 98-103 in P.E.Hart (ed)
Unemployment and Labour Market Policies (Aldershot: Gower, 1986)
p98
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to move young people up the job queue (by, for instance, cutting
the cost of youth labor through wage subsidies) are not given
extensive treatment. Although there may be some economic
rationale for these policies, on the grounds that finding a
first job is the most difficult part of the transition into the
labor market, the low skill jobs at which these policies are
aimed do little to equip young people with skills that offer
longer term employment stability6.
It is now important to review our selected objective, target
group and policies in more detail.
1.1 THE OBJECTIVE: IMPROVED ECONOMIC COMPETITIVENESS
It is useful to start from a most basic correlation: among
industrial nations, the most economically successful countries
in the last twenty years seem to have been those with the most
educated and skilled workforces. It is hard to prove a direct
one to one relationship between education and economic
performance, largely because of the number of variables
involved, but as Stevens says:
6 Sheldrake and Vickerstaff call these policies "the misuse
of training as a palliative for unemployment" and label the pursuit
of them the 'poor law effect'. See J.Sheldrake and S.Vickerstaff
The History of Industrial Training in the United Kingdom
(Aldershot: Avebury Press, 1987) p2
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... a well educated and highly skilled workforce is a vital
prerequisite for innovation and growth, and for the timely
adaptation of industrial structures to rapidly changing
economic and technological conditions
Putting Japanese exceptionalism to one side, a comparison of
West Germany with the UK and US is instructive, not least
because such a comparison has informed policy development in
Britain in the 1980s. In terms of rates of unemployment,
inflation, and current account balance as a percentage of
GDP/GNP, German economic performance has been consistently
impressive (lowest inflation, third lowest unemployment, and
fourth highest current account balance of 12 OECD countries
between 1973 and 1987)8. On the supply side, vocational training
seems to be more comprehensive in West Germany. For example, on
the basis of their study of five occupations in Britain and
Germany, Prais and Wagner conclude that 60% of the German
workforce have an intermediate vocational qualification
(comparable to an apprenticeship) while only 30% do in the U.
? B.Stevens Training for Technological Change (Brussels: Centre
for European Policy Studies, 1986) p7. Stevens reports that there
is evidence on how lack of technical skills and expertise can hold
back the assimilation of new technologies into production methods.
See, for instance J.Northcutt et al Microelectronics in Industry:
An International Comparison: Britain. Germany. France (London:
Policy Studies Institute, 1985)
a See T.Notermans 'The German Macroeconomic Policy Stance'
(Paper prepared for the Graduate Student Conference on Western
Europe, Columbia University, New York, April 1988) p2
9 S.J.Prais and K.Wagner 'Some Practical Aspects of Human
Capital Investment: Training Standards in Five Occupations in
Britain and Germany' pp 46-65 in NIER (August 1983)
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Meanwhile, in the US, the New York Times reports that the Senate
has approved changes in the immigration laws to establish for
the first time ranking of some visa applicants on the basis of
their work credentials in order to help overcome skill shortages
in the US'0.
There seem to be three ways to understand this correlation, the
first two grounded in labor economics", the third derived from
the rapid technological change that is transforming production
in the industrialized world. Probably the most influential
paradigm in the literature remains human capital theory, which
takes as its guiding thread the neoclassical assumption that
workers are paid according to the value of their marginal
product 2. This marginal product is assumed to be dependent on
education/training, giving people and firms an incentive to
invest in their own education or training on the basis of
anticipated future returns in the form of increased wages or
improved productivity. However, the clear prescription of this
analysis has been questioned, as Kazis explains, because of
doubts about the empirical justification for its three-step
'0 R.Suro 'Employers Are Looking Abroad For the Skilled and
the Energetic' in The New York Times 16 July 1989 Section 4 p4
" See R.Kazis 'The Relationship between Education and
Productivity: Implications for the Composition of American
Manufacturing and the Movement for Educational Reform' (Unpublished
Mimeo) for a comprehensive survey of the literature in this field
12 It is of course a fact, and not an assumption, that
education is positively correlated with income
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analysis: increments of education and training do not seem to be
clearly linked to increases in earnings; the link between
marginal productivity and earnings is at best unproven; and the
direct relationship between education and productivity still
needs to be firmly established.
The problems associated with the exclusive reliance of human
capital theory on atomistic supply side decisions by individuals
has been challenged in the 1970s and 1980s by a second major
school of analysis that looks instead at the demand side of the
labor market. It is argued that characteristics of jobs, not
workers, should be the basic unit of analysis. The link between
education and income is accepted, but is traced through the use
of education as a convenient screening device by employers
rather than through the intrinsic value of education for greater
productivity.
Underlying all recent arguments about VET, however, is a view
of technological change, and the challenge it poses to labor
market flexibility in the industrialized world. At every stage
of industrial development, technological innovations have placed
new demands on workers, sometimes requiring the sacrifice of
craft skills for greater productivity. There seems to be a
growing consensus, however, that in the technological age
ushered in by the microchip, many workers will need higher and
certainly more flexible skills to find employment. Writing with
12
reference to the British economy, Taylor has gone as far as to
say that "as many as 70% of the workforce will soon be knowledge
workers, reversing the situation of some 50 years ago, when 70%
of the workers were in manual, unskilled jobs"D.
It is possible to reach this conclusion using different
analyses. One can argue that skills are increasingly important
because low wage competition from newly industrializing
countries in mass production sectors has forced traditionally
strong industrial powers to shift to new higher skill markets 4.
Alternatively, Prais has argued that the technological shift to
automation, defined as the replacement of unskilled workers with
machines, is different from mechanization, which he defines as
the replacement of skilled craftsmen by machines operated by
unskilled workers. At least in the latter case, he argues, the
U C.Taylor 'Climbing towards a skilful revolution' p22 in
Times Educational SuPDlement 22 January 1988, quoted in D.Gleeson
The Paradox of Training (Milton Keynes: Open University Press,
1989). See also 'Swedish Schools: Working Classes' pp 15-18 in
The Economist 12 November 1988 which declares: "Even the children
of manual workers, who everywhere still enter the least
intellectual jobs, will have to use their minds more in the 1990s
than their parents did in the 1960s" (p15). Debate on this issue
is fiercest the US, and centers on whether jobs of the future will
be in fields that are the fastest growing (in percentage terms,
like those in high tech industries) or those where the largest
number of new jobs, in absolute terms, are currently being created
(mainly in the service sector). The implications of each analysis
for training policy are clear. See H.M.Levin and M.Carnoy School
and Work in a Democratic State (Stanford, CA: Stanford University
Press, 1985)
14 See for example W.H.Miller 'Employers Wrestle with 'Dumb'
Kids' pp 47-52 in Industry Week 4 July 1988 p50
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skilled craftsmen could be taken on in a supervisory role: with
automation, few such jobs are created °. The argument then
assumes that relatively skilled jobs will be available for
workers to take up in the future'6. A final justification for VET
concerns the changing nature of the supply of labor,
specifically the shift within it to groups of people (women,
minorities, recent immigrants) who have traditionally had
limited opportunities to acquire sophisticated skills and who
therefore pose an especially difficult training challenge to
government".
If the task for public policy is to help raise skills to the
levels required by modern employment, governments are
immediately confronted with the need to define the sort of
skills they want to promote. This issue is considered in the
discussion (below) of policies for vocational training, but it
is useful at this point to consider two alternative directions
Prais 'Comment' op cit p98
16 See Kazis 'Relation Between Education and Productivity' pp
48ff and references. The alternative is to believe that increased
skill requirements will not be associated with continued labor
demand for the whole workforce - no government has yet admitted
this.
17 For example, white males will constitute 15% of new entrants
to the US labor force in the 1990s, and by the year 2000 women,
minorities and immigrants will make up 80% of entrants to the labor
force. See M.L.Dertouzos, R.Lester, R.Solow and the MIT Commission
on Industrial Productivity Made in America: Regaining the
Productive Edge (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1989) p93 and
J.S.McClenahan 'Training Americans for Work: Industry's Monumental
Challenge' pp 52-60 in Industry Week 19 September 1988 p52
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for policies designed to bridge the gap between required and
existing skills.
One way to think about the choices on offer is to contrast a
strategy that aims to help particular firms meet their immediate
labor requirements with a strategy that is intended to use
skills training to change and then meet the shape of labor
demand in the economy in the future. We can best understand
these approaches by examining the contrasts between them. In
the former case, the impact of the training on offer would be to
improve the position of certain workers - ethnic minorities for
instance - in the employment queue, and satisfy existing demand
for labor in the economy. This may still leave considerable
numbers of people without work, and/or leave a large percentage
of the workforce in declining industries. The latter strategy,
on the other hand, would try and help a country leap beyond what
Finegold and Soskice call a "low-skills equilibrium": the aim is
to break out of the vicious circle in which "the majority of
enterprises (are) staffed by poorly trained managers and workers
producing low quality goods and services" and to build in its
place an economy which grows by responding to new demands, not
resisting them"8. The policy implications of these alternatives
are considered at greater length below. First of all, however,
18 D.Finegold and D.Soskice 'The Future of Training in Britain:
Analysis and Prescription' pp 21-50 in Oxford Review of Economic
Policy Vol 4, No 3 (Autumn 1988) p22
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we must see how the education and training of young people fits
into strategies for economic advance.
1.2 THE TARGET GROUP: SCHOOL LEAVERS
We have already noted that one obvious way to disaggregate the
workforce is by age. A lower boundary can be defined fairly
easily as the lowest age at which pupils are allowed to leave
school. The upper boundary presents greater problems, most
obviously because people try and enter the labor market at
various points up to fifteen years after this minimum school
leaving age. Nonetheless, OECD data does suggest that an upper
limit of 25 years of age produces a group with common
characteristics. Most obviously, it is a group of people with
tenuous links to the labor market. In 1982, for instance, at
the height of economic recession, young people made up less than
one fifth of the labor force in the OECD countries, but more
than two fifths of the unemployment totals 9. However, these
aggregate figures conceal large differences between member
countries of the OECD. Youth unemployment was 2.4 times the
adult level in the United Kingdom and 2.3 times as large in the
US, but only 1.7 times the adult level in West Germany (1981
figure) and at the other end of the scale 3.3 times the
(admittedly low) Swedish adult levels. Appendix 1, covering the
19 Cited in New Policies for the Young (OECD, 1985) p34
X New Policies for the Younq Ibid p18
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1980s, demonstrates the variations in youth unemployment rates
relative to adult levels in various countries'.
These statistics for under 25s are significant, because they at
least partly reflect the outcome of public policy for the school
to work transition in different countries. Unlike figures
covering the under 20 age group, for instance, they cannot
easily be 'massaged' through the extension of training/work
experience schemes. Also, they cover the first years in the
labor force of VET 'graduates' and should reflect any positive
effect of VET programs on employment prospects.
The message of these figures is quite clear: beyond the general
flow of the macroeconomic tide, young people - even in the broad
definition of people aged 16-25 - are particularly vulnerable to
economic conditions, and in some countries more at risk than in
others.
2 There is serious debate about the extent to which different
factors account for these differential unemployment rates. In
broad terms, two main lines of argument can be discerned: those
which place primary emphasis on the varying supply side attributes
of the young people concerned (either relating to their education
and skills or, from the neoclassical standpoint, the costs
associated with hiring them), and those which argue from a
Keynesian perspective that the problem of youth unemployment is a
microcosm of the general unemployment problem whose roots lie in
deficient aggregate demand in the economy as a whole. For a review
of these arguments, see Hart Youth Unemployment op cit
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Although the upper age limit of 25 provides a useful statistical
guide to the youth employment situation, for purposes of public
policy it is not so much actual age as employment intentions
that are important. A disaggregated analysis of the youth
population allows for more informed and targeted policy
prescription. However, there is an obvious problem in trying to
pinpoint the entry of young people into the workforce: there is
no one 'place', or one 'transition', made by young people from
school to work, but rather a number of places at which the
transition to working life can be made. As Clarke and Willis
point out, "youth" is not a common process, but one
differentiated by class, race, and gender with different
starting points and different destinations. Coleman goes as
far as to define five points at which a transition from school
to work may be deemed to have taken place: first, after the
first entry of a young person into the labor force (often in a
part time job, with little connection to other aspects of the
transition, or to later employment); second, after the first
exit from education for over three months (which unfortunately
lumps together 16 year old school leavers with both college-
bound young people taking time off to travel and with college
graduates); third, when the person finds their first full time
job; fourth, after the last exit from education; and finally, at
2 See J.Clarke and P.Willis 'Introduction' pp 1-16 in I.Bates
et al Schooling for the Dole: The New Vocationalism? (London:
MacMillan, 1984) pp 6ff
18
the time of the final launching into the labor market, after the
last exit from education and the first full time jobs. None of
these definitions is really satisfactory to describe the group
of people at whom school to work policies have primarily been
aimed. For the purposes of this thesis, our central focus will
be on policies aimed at young people leaving school with the aim
of finding work without further education: in other words, a
subset of the fifth definition (which as it stands includes
college graduates and college dropouts). 
This group of young people is a 'risk group' because of its low
educational qualifications and high vulnerability to
unemployment and other social misfortunes. It is a group within
the youth population that holds a most marginal place in labor
market and is also a group whose size (and therefore political
salience) grew enormously in the 1960s and 1970s because of the
"youth bulges" arising from high birth rates after the second
world war and in the early 1960s. At the same time, there are
likely to be high marginal benefits of skills training for this
group because of their low initial skill base.
P J.Coleman 'The School to Work Transition' pp 35-40 in The
Teenage Unemployment Problem: What are the Options? (Congressional
Budget Office, 1976) p35
a See D.Plunkett 'The Risk Group: education and training
policies for disadvantaged young people in Sweden and Denmark' pp
39-46 in Comparative Education Vol 18 No 1 (1982) p39
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1.3 THE POLICIES: YOUTH VET
At a most basic level, all governments insist that their
policies for youth VET are designed to help the job prospects
of young people by improving their skills. However, such
statements conceal as much as they reveal. We need to ask what
sort of jobs people are being trained for. Will the skills they
acquire give them power in the labor market? Do the skills
offer the prospect of upward career mobility? Although the
character of youth VET is quite clearly circumscribed by the
population at which it is directed - average, or below average
achievers in school - its content can play a major role in
limiting or expanding the horizons of the people it aims to
help. We therefore need to reject a one-dimensional notion of
"skills training", and ask what sort of skills young people are
acquiring. To do this, we need to look carefully at policies
for youth VET in two key areas, first, in the content of the
High School curriculum, and second, in the vocational training
provided for school leavers. We will briefly review the issues
arising at each of these stages of VET policy.
Given the primarily work-based distribution systems on which
capitalist democracies rest, an inevitable tension arises in the
construction of the educational curriculum. The desire to open
up the world of learning to young people is tempered by the
pressure to arm them with particular skills required for the
world of work. We will see that on the British Right, where
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this tension has been elevated-to the status of a dichotomy,
demands for 'vocational realism' are part of a critique of high-
minded mass liberal arts teaching. Beyond basic literacy and
numeracy, which everyone agrees are central to any school
curriculum, it is argued that school courses for 'non-academic'
pupils should be made specifically relevant to future
occupations. For example, vocational education, work
experience, and 'life skills' should be added to the school
curriculum to make the leap from dependency to productivity less
difficult, and thereby make young people more attractive as
potential employees. A key dilemma arises immediately, however,
and we will see that different governments have tackled it in
different ways. It concerns the early labelling of children as
'non-academic', their placement in a vocational stream and the
consequent denial to them of the stimuli and opportunities
presented by liberal education.
As for vocational training, it is important to link our earlier
discussion of the alternative strategies for economic advance
(planning for a higher skill equilibrium versus meeting
immediate market demands) to their practical application in
training provision. In each of the cases, a 'deficit' model of
the typical unemployed person posits the need to improve their
employment attributes, but each strategy demands very different
sorts of training. Most obviously, there is a spectrum of
skills on offer spanning from broad-based, transferable skills
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to training for specific, routinized tasks. Thus, Japanese
workers (in company run schemes) are trained in several
departments, in the classroom, through correspondence courses,
and in quality circles" while the prevailing image of YTS
training in Britain in the early 1980s was of shelf-stacking or
other menial and routine service sector tasks. At the same
time, in some firms in some countries, an ethos of critical
thinking and involvement can reach down to workers: the MIT
Commission on Industrial Productivity reports, for instance, on
the partnership between Italian fashion designers and loom
operators in the design and use of different fabrics".
Two questions for the design of a training program immediately
arise from this analysis: first, what is an appropriate balance
between on the job and classroom based teaching; second, how
should the needs of individual employers for immediately
relevant training in specific skills be reconciled with the
longer term requirement of the economy (and employers as a
group) for more than functional competence on the part of
2 See Dertouzos et al Made in America op cit pp 87/8. See
also R.P.Dore and M.Sako How the Japanese Learn to Work (London:
Routledge, 1989)
2 See S.Berger et al 'The US Textile Industry: Challenges and
Opportunities in an Era of International Competition' in The
Workinc Papers of the MIT Commission on Industrial Productivity
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1989). The Commission also reports that
one Japanese textile firm claims that its workers submit some 6,000
suggestions per year for improvements in manufacturing processes.
See Dertouzos et al Ibid p300
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workers=. With respect to the first question, we will see in
later chapters that the merits of the West German 'dual system',
where young people spend one day in class for every four on the
job, are widely acknowledged. However, the content of classroom
teaching remains a subject of much controversy: we will see that
in different settings it spans from sophisticated analysis of
the latest technological developments to role-playing in
preparation for work and life situations. As for the balance
between general and specific skills, this is in large part a
function of the structure of schemes in different countries,
programs based on employer control of training content veering
towards the provision of specific skills. The balance between
the two is obviously critical given their place in the
alternative economic strategies on offer.
Clearly, an array of policies, spanning different government
departments, can affect the transition from school to work.
How might government seek to achieve its goals for VET? In the
education field, the most obvious method is through the
centralization of control over the curriculum, and this is being
vigorously pursued in the UK. In countries with strong
federalist traditions, and continuing strength in independent
local government, however, the harmonization of what is taught
" Streeck argues that firms of the future will need workers
equipped with "skills as a eneral polyvalent resource that can be
put to many different and, most importantly, as yet unknown future
uses". See W.Streeck 'Skills and the Limits of Neo-Liberalism: The
Enterprise of the Future as a Place of Learning' (Unpublished
Mimeo, 1987) p21. Quotation cited in Dertouzos et al Made in
America op cit p87
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in schools is more difficult, and to a greater or lesser extent
exhortation has to take the place of intervention. As for
training, the position is more complicated, not least because of
the politics implied by each of the strategies on offer. We
will see that for many years in the UK and US, training policy
was not considered to be a province of public policy, and was
left to industry. However, even when government recognizes its
stake in quality training provision, there are at least three
levels of involvement it can pursues: a hortatory approach, based
on an appeal to the private sector (for instance the JOBS
program in the US in the 1960s); financial incentives to private
sector training provision of a particular type (British programs
in the 1960s and 1970s); and finally direct intervention to
regulate training provision (for instance, federal regulations
in Germany on the content of training programs).
If we are now clear about the range of options open to
governments, I want to move on to argue that existing attempts
to group countries according to their approach to VET - useful
though they are - fail to pinpoint key differences between youth
policy as practiced in different nations. Accordingly,
following a brief review of the models currently on offer, I
will propose a new typology which will, I hope, help us better
understand youth labor market policy.
2 These are taken from P.Osterman The Youth Labor Market
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1980) p159
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1.4 THE ANALYTIC TOOL: A TYPOLOGY OF YOUTH VET POLICY
The Report of the MIT Commission on Industrial Productivity
represents the state of the art in North American analysis of
the links between education, training and economic performance,
and includes an examination of routes from school to work in
different countries. The Commission concluded that two such
routes can be seen in the industrialized world today: in
'Pattern A' countries (including the US, Sweden and the UK),
"formal educational institutions provide most of the specialized
skills that are used in work, and on-the-job training provides
little beyond quick task-related instruction"s; meanwhile in
'Pattern B' countries (like West Germany and Japan) on-the-job
training is used to develop general as well as specialized
skills. Not surprisingly, some portion of the better economic
performance of Pattern B countries is explained by the more
flexible skills of German and Japanese workers, and this
flexibility is traced to their training on the job.
While there is merit to this analysis, there are also problems.
Most obviously, as the Commission itself notes, the Swedish
system seems to produce West German/Japanese style results.
Secondly, British training was for years famed for consisting of
'sitting by Nellie' - which is theoretically on the job
training, but which would not meet West German or Japanese
standards. Furthermore, while it is true that the studies cited
by the Commission show broader training in German plants than
" Dertouzos et al Made in America op cit p83
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British ones, and more flexible use of manufacturing systems in
Japan than the US", there is concern in Germany that its system
is biased towards the provision of specific skills and will
therefore place the country at a competitive disadvantage vis-
a-vis Japan'. Finally, and importantly for our purposes, the
Commission's typology does not isolate the role of government
policy in the different countries. The Swedish approach is
highly interventionist, but is grouped with the British system
which, as we will see, has veered between voluntarism and
varying degrees of regulation over the last thirty years. I am
keen to try and develop a model of Rolicy in the training field,
and while the approach taken by the MIT Commission will inform
such a model, it cannot provide the basis for it.
In their History of Industrial Training in Britain Sheldrake and
Vickerstaff introduce an alternative approach, and suggest that
three models of training provision exist, each defined by its
source of funds and final responsibility for training ~. Thus
they suggest that the American system should be labelled 'free
market', dominated as it is by private funding and organisation
with training taking place in companies or private training or
" See A.Sorge and M.Warner "Manpower Training, Manufacturing
Organisation, and Workplace Relations in Great Britain and West
Germany' pp 318-333 in British Journal of Industrial Relations 18
(1980) and R.Jaikumar 'Postindustrial Manufacturing' Harvard
Business Review November/December 1986
31 See M.Jackson 'Germans raise doubt about their system' Times
Educational Supplement 13 July 1984 p10
2 Sheldrake and Vickerstaff The History of Industrial Training
op cit p55ff
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vocational colleges. They label the second model
'interventionist', based on the French example of public funding
and public organisation with the legal institution of rights and
duties on trainees and trainers. Finally, they suggest that the
West German system should be called 'corporatist', because of
its joint funding from public and private sources and tripartite
delivery system within a framework of nationally agreed
procedures and standards.
There are, however, weaknesses in this approach as well. First
of all, while the American system may rely to a large extent on
provision of training through the market, it is also the case
that public funding and provision is important: between 1961 and
the early 1980s, there was a 1000 fold increase in the federal
government's funding commitment to employment and training
initiatives', and that most public of institutions, the US Army,
provides some half a million training places a year. More
importantly, however, the typology reveals little about the
structure or content of public policy in the different
countries.
O Cited in S.A.Levitan and F.Gallo A Second Chance: Traininq
for Jobs (Kalamazoo, MI: W.E. Upjohn Institute, 1988) p3
8 Cited in Competence and Competition: Training and Education
in the FRG, US and Japan (London: MSC/NEDO, 1984) p3
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David Brian Robertson has gone some way towards correcting these
lacunae' . He recognizes that labor market strategies are central
to political struggles over income and power distribution in
different countries and therefore adds a second dimension of
analysis to the longstanding bifurcation between active and
passive labor market policy (which Robertson measures by the
ratio of government expenditure on 'active' measures like
employment and training programs to that on 'passive' programs
like transfer payments). This second dimension turns on the
preferred distributional outcome of the policy (or set of
policies), and produces a 'liberal' strategy at one pole, based
on the free operation of the market, and a 'social democratic'
strategy at the other, giving priority to the job and/or income
prospects of workers. Thus, the combination of these dimensions
produces four possible strategies: a 'guardian' strategy based
on preserving job security and income levels for workers; an
'egalitarian' strategy combining social democratic goals with
the active use of the state to equalize the market power of
employers and workers; a 'business-centred' strategy that leaves
decisions to the market; and a newly resuscitated strategy of
'active neo-liberalism', designed to use state power to free the
market from political and institutional fetters3.
g D.B.Robertson 'Mrs Thatcher's Employment Prescription: An
Active Neo-Liberal Labor Market Policy' pp 275-292 in Journal of
Public policy Volume 6, No 3 (August 1986) and 'Governing and Jobs:
America's Business-Centred Labor Market Policy' pp 427-455 in
Polity 1988
6 Charles Maier has noted that state power has been regularly
used in America to roll back both private and public authority over
citizens, citing the abolition of slavery and the end of
prohibition as examples. See C.Maier 'Introduction' pp 1-24 in
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There is much in this analysis that is of use to us: it is based
on policies pursued by various governments, and recognizes that
the content of labor market policy must be understood in the
broader context of economic and social policy. At the same
time, however, it needs to be refined to further our
understanding of youth policy: although Robertson recognizes
that government 'activity' can take various forms (sometimes
doing little to build long term economic strength) his model
cannot distinguish different strategies within the 'activist'
strand of policy-making. While our discussion of policy has so
far concentrated on policy content, I want to suggest that we
must also take account of the place of youth VET policy in
relation to other government policies, most obviously economic
and education policy.
Government 'strategy' for youth VET policy therefore refers
above all in my model to whether policy for youth is developed
as part of an integrated and planned strategy for economic
advance, or as ad hoc reactions to specific problems in the
labor market. As the OECD pointed out in 1985:
C.Maier (ed) The Changing Boundaries of the Political (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1987). In the strictly economic field,
however, we need to follow Robertson's reference to Polanyi's
identification of the 1834 Poor Law Amendment Act (the "New Poor
Law") in Britain as the key example of state action to facilitate
the freest possible operation of the labor market. See K.Polanyi
The Great Transformation (Boston: Beacon, 1944)
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No country can adopt one single policy to improve its youth
unemployment situation. Balance and diversity are needed
to match the complexity of causes and the range of effects.
The same could be said of almost any public policy area."
Pressure from the electorate, bureaucratic and political power
games, and sometimes the shape of political institutions can all
conspire to make this sort of comprehensive and long term policy
making extremely difficult: the coordination and balance
recommended by the OECD is not easy to come by. We will see
that policy for youth VET, which calls for coordination between
traditionally separate policy areas, is both peculiarly
vulnerable to the hazards of piecemeal government action and
especially in need of an integrated approach. The structure of
youth VET policy is therefore important for the implications it
has for successful policy making.
The second dimension of policy which will be central to this
thesis is control over the content of policy, the importance of
which for economic competitiveness we noted earlier. I will
argue that the key element of this content is the extent to
which market forces are given power over the content of policy.
Emphasis on the content of the training is important, because I
do not want to suggest that government plays no role in what I
call a 'market-based' system. British experience suggests that
the goverrment can be involved intimately in a program whose
3 New Policies for the Young op cit p13
X See for example J.Moon, D.Webber and J.J.Richardson 'Linking
Policy Areas: IT Education, Training and Youth Unemployment in the
UK and West Germany' pp 161-187 in Policy and Politics Vol 14, No2
(April 1986).
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content is guided or run by private sector employers. For
instance, the government can set and pay the allowances of
trainees, offset employers' costs, and be charged with policing
the participation of young people in the program. The
traditional typology that stretches from voluntarism to
intervention does not therefore do frill justice to the
complexity of the overall picture of youth VET provision.
The alternatives to market guidance/delegation are obviously a
balance between public and private direction, the program being
more or less integrated into the demands of the private economy,
or ultimately a solely public program. The unashamedly
refornist ambitions of even the most far-reaching plans make the
imposition of various socially defined goals the most that
government can do. As Willis writes, "It cannot be avoided that
'training' rot only helps to reproduce but is explicitly
addressed to reproducing the existing division of labor"'
We can therefore derive various combinations of policy structure
and content by which to group various countries:
w P.Willis 'Foreward' in Finn Trainina Without Jobs op cit pxv
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Who controls the content of training?
Mkt-based Public/Private Public
Partnership
Integrated UK 1981+ WG <----- Swe ----- >
What s the
aovernment
approach to
policy for
youth VBT?
Ad hoc <------------ UK 1964-1981 ------------>
< ------------ US 1961-1989 ----------- >
Reality is obviously much more complex than this model suggests,
and positions on the two axes need to be seen more as part of a
spectrum of possible options than rigidly demarcated choices.
Nonetheless, this sort of classification is useful because each
category carries predictive weight. As we will see, ad hoc
policy-making makes it difficult to establish smooth channels
for the transition from school to work. Mrs Thatcher learnt
this lesson and shifted policy in Britain from the lower half of
the table to the upper, thus escaping many of the problems that
continue to plague American policy. However, programs that
allow individual employers to decide on the content of training
tend to the provision of specific as opposed to transferable
skills. We will see that this is the heart of the paradox of
British policy in the 1980s: by moving to a market-based system,
Mrs Thatcher undermined the potential of her program. In
contrast, we will see that the partnership between public and
private sectors in West Germany and Sweden, based on the
regulation of private activities by government, contrives to
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give training in these countries a longer term outlook.
In order to see how the general tendencies outlined in the table
interact with country-specific factors we need to move on to our
case studies. They are the subject of Chapter 2.
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Chapter 2
THREE TRACKS OF PUBLIC POLICY 1960-1989
It is my contention that since 1945 the governments of various
advanced capitalist countries have pursued markedly different
policies in the field of youth employment and training. By
way of illustration, this chapter looks at the policies (and
their national context) in four such countries - Britain,
America, West Germany and Sweden.
A. Piecemeal Activism
2.1.1 BRITAIN 1964-81
Although attempts to formulate a national manpower and
employment policy have been traced back to Elizabeth I and the
Statute of Artificers of 156340, governments in Britain from
the Industrial Revolution to the early post second world war
period were loathe to involve themselves in the internal
workings of industry. This is interesting given, firstly, the
dire warnings of government commissions about the state of
British workmanship and its effect on the country's economic
strength, and secondly the debate about state provision of
education, and its relationship to employment. Both provide
useful background to an analysis of British policy choices
after 1945.
40 See P.J.C. Perry The Evolution of British Manpower Policy
(Portsmouth: BACIE, 1976) p6ff
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Keep and Mayhew4 1 note that as early as 1852, Lyon Playfair
warned of the need for UK manufacturing to have better
technical education to keep its lead over foreign competitors,
and in the wake of the economic depression of the 1880s, a
Royal Commission reporting in 1886 cited "superior technical
education of workmen in foreign countries" as one of eight
principal causes of the economic downturn in Britain4 2
Although wartime mobilization in 1914 forced greater
involvement of government in industrial management - 38
government training centers trained 525,000 workers during the
war 43 - the end of the war marked a return to the voluntarist
status quo ante, and twenty more years in which government
left vocational education to industry.
World War II further exposed British economic weakness -
German output in manufacturing rose by six times the British
increase in the war years4 4 - and prompted two further Royal
Commissions to insist on the need for closer application of
science to industry. By 1949, the Permanent Secretary at the
41 E.Keep and K.Mayhew 'The Assessment: Education, Training
and Economic Performance' in Oxford Review of Economic Policy
Vol 4 No 3 (Autumn 1988) pii
42 Royal Commission on the Depression quoted in Perry
British ManRower Policy op cit p32
43 Cited in Perry Ibid p47
44 Cited in P.Anderson 'The Figures of Descent' pp 20-77
in New Left Review No 161 (January/February 1987) p46
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Ministry of Labour, Sir Godfrey Ince, responded to the failure
of employers adequately to train employees by saying that "no
employer should be allowed to engage a youth unless he is
prepared to train him properly and adequately" 4 5. Despite
continued warnings, however, we will see that the first
(admittedly faltering) steps towards government intervention
did not occur until the 1960s. One of the reasons for this
timidity may have been the longstanding bifurcation between
education and training that has pervaded attempts to improve
the training system i Britain.
Although it is now commonplace to argue both that British
education is framed for the benefit of an elite group, and
that a bias against technical education and industry dating
from the Victorian era imbued the policy priorities of
successive governments, each point is worthy of note. It is
first of all significant that although a strong and broad
educational grounding was highly regarded by the mid
nineteenth century, it was not considered necessary to spread
its benefits across the population as a wole46. Even with
45 Quoted in Perry British Manpower Policy op cit p51
46 The 1851 Northcote-Trevelyan Report on the Civil Service
stated that "We believe that men...of up to two or one and
twenty with studies which have no immediate connection with the
business of any profession, of which the immediate effect is
merely to open, to invigorate and to enrich the mind will
generally be found in the business of every profession superior
to men who have at 18 or 19 devoted themselves to the special
duties of their calling". The Report did not, however, contain
calls for the expansion of this general education. Quoted in
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legislation for compulsory elementary schooling in 1870, the
expansion of compulsory education to the secondary stage in
the 1918 Education Act, and the growing influence of the
Labour Party in Parliament, Rodney Barker reports that in the
1920s "the parties shared a common assumption that secondary
(grammar) education was a prize for the few...the argument was
about access to educational privilege"47 . Despite successive
reforms of tertiary education (following the 1944 Education
Act and the 1959 Crowther Report), and the expansion of higher
education under the impetus of the Robens Report in 1963, by
the 1980s only 16% of British 18 year olds were going into
further education, and the recently reformed '0 (for
'Ordinary') Level exams that were a passport to academic
studies beyond the age of 16 were intended for only those
regarded as being among the most able 40% of the age group.
In terms of general education, therefore, British school
leavers have been ill-equipped for the transition to
employment, especially in the face of growing demands from
employers for higher educational attainment48.
Perry Ibid p164
47 R.Barker Education and Politics 1900-51: a Study of the
Labour Party (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982) p54. Quoted in
W.Taylor 'Production and Educational Values' pp 101-112 in G.D.N
Worswick (ed) Education and Economic Performance (Aldershot:
Gower Press, 1985) p105
48 Prais and Wagner report that twice as many German
schoolchildren as British reach university entrance standards,
and while 32% of German school leavers gain an intermediate
school leaving certificate, only 14% reach an equivalent level
in the UK. See S.Prais and K.Wagner 'Schooling Standards in
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As for the bifurcation between traditional scholarship and
scientific/technical education, both Williams and Weiner
document the role of Victorian elite educational institutions
(principally the major 'public' schools and the ancient
universities) in "propagating an academic and cultural
heritage imbued with disdain for vocational applications,
especially industrial manufacturing"49. In this argument, and
that of Anderson50 , the anti-industrial culture of English
ruling elites in the late Victorian period is seen as central
to the development of a climate antithetical to the need for
industrial and economic development, thus hastening Britain's
decline as a world economic power. For our purposes, however,
the broader economic argument can be put to one side: instead,
we need only recognize that training was divorced from the
traditional educational realm at a very early stage, and
further that partly as a consequence of this bifurcation, the
provision of training for employment was considered to be
outside the legitimate sphere of government activity. Despite
England and Germany: Some Summary Comparisons Bearing on
Economic Performance' pp 53-76 in IER No 112 (May 1985) pp
56,59. See also discussion below
49 Quotation from A.G. Watts 'Education and Employment:The
Traditional Bonds' pp 9-22 in R.Dale (ed) Education, Training
and Employment: Towards a New Vocationalism? (Oxford: Pergamon
Press, 1985). See also R.Williams The Long Revolution (London:
Chatto and Windus, 1961) and M. Weiner English Culture and the
Decline of the Industrial Spirit (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1981)
50 See Anderson 'Figures of Descent' op cit pp 32ff,41,57
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the growing sense of foreboding that we have documented above,
governments resisted any inclination to try and improve the
opportunities for vocational education until the 1960s,
preferring instead to leave training for employment in the
hands of industry.
1964 Industrial Trainina Act
Government concern with the state of training provision, and
its ability to cope with the 'youth bulge' arising from the
unusually large age cohort born at the end of the Second World
War, is evident in the report of the Carr Committee in the mid
1950s. The Committee's Report, published in February 1958,
formed the basis of the last attempt to make the existing
system work without government intervention. The conclusion
of the Committee was blunt: "...existing facilities for
training are inadequate in quantity, and in some cases in
quality as well" it said51. Nonetheless, the Committee
insisted that the division of labor between government and
industry should remain unchanged, with exhortation and
monitoring to take the place of structural reform. By
September 1960, there was no evidence of increased provision,
and the idea of a compulsory training levy was first floated.
Finally, in December 1962 the government published a White
Paper announcing its intention to promote training provision.
51 Quoted in Perry British Manpower Policy op cit p65
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It proposed three objectives for the new legislation: to match
training provision more closely with economic needs and
technological development; to improve the overall quality of
industrial training and establish minimum standards; and
finally to allow the costs of training to be spread more
evenly52 . An editorial in The Times called this a
"spectacular and revolutionary advance"53 because of
government's intention to take on final responsibility for the
shape of training provision. With the benefit of hindsight,
however, we can see that the new structure bore many of the
hallmarks of the old, and consequently failed to root out its
most deepseated problems.
The government saw the failure of sufficient number of firms
to provide training as an example of the 'free rider' problem,
whereby firms could avoid the costs associated with training
by "poaching" trained workers from other firms. The
government's answer was to try and generalize best practice
throughout industry through a system known as 'levy/grant'.
An Industrial Training Board (ITB), staffed by representatives
of employers, unions and government, would be set up to
administer a levy on every firm in a given industry, granting
rebates to those employers deemed to be providing suitable
52 See Perry Ibid pp 100ff; also P.G.Chapman M.J.Tooze The
Youth Training Scheme op cit pp 25/6
53 Quoted in Perry Ibid p102
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volume and quality of training54 . The intention was clearly
to reverse the incentives, and make it worthwhile for firms to
offer training to employees.
The strength of voluntarist feeling constraining dramatic
advance can perhaps be best gauged from the comments of Lady
Williams, a leading campaigner for reform of the training
system and a key voice in government deliberations on the
reforms. She felt the need to couch her defence of the
proposals in the following terms:
If you think of all the things that we have been doing
over the last fifty or sixty years, I think you will see
that what I am suggesting is really part of the
traditional pattern. We have always had, and I hope we
always shall have, a great respect for voluntary action,
voluntary negotiation and individual freedom
It should be clear that the extent of government intervention
under the plan was limited, and made no attempt to construct
an integrated nationwide training system. Even if the
government plan had worked optimally, there would still have
been 27 ITBs running 27 different training systems, with
individual firms satisfying the requirements of their ITB in
different ways. Despite calls from trade union leaders for a
more systematic approach to the problem, involving unskilled
and semi-skilled as well as craft workers, links with
54 See M.Anderson and J.Fairley 'The Politics of Industrial
Training in the UK' pp 191-208 in Journal of Public Policy Vol
3 No 2 (May 1983)
55 Quoted in Perry British Manpower Policy op cit p105
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educational reform, and coordination through a central body,
no such changes were proposed. In his comprehensive history
of the development of the Act, Perry gives a hint of the
limited horizons of reformers:
(The ITBs) were designed to do a practical job, not to
implement an ideological master plan...The Act made no
attempt to dot the "i's" and crosg6the t's" in a way
common to Continental legislation
Given the gradualist aims of the legislation, it is perhaps
not surprising that the background chorus of concern about the
state of British VET should have continued during the 1960s.
However, a major spur for further reform came from the
failures of the mechanisms set up under the Act. By their
nature, the ITB's were ill-suited to coordinate training and
skills required in more than one sector, and were not in a
position to cater for the transfer of labor from declining to
expanding industries. Furthermore, the industry basis of the
training boards forced ITB's to try and make nationwide
contacts with firms of varying sizes, something which it seems
they failed to do57. Finally, the Boards made little progress
towards reaching out to the unskilled and semi-skilled
sections of the youth population. These were the major
concerns that motivated lobbying from business for legislative
56 Perry Ibid op cit p5
57 Small businesses were particularly disenchanted with the
functioning of the system. See D.Gleeson 'The Privatisation of
Industry and the Nationalisation of Youth' pp 57-72 in Dale (ed)
Education. Training and Employment op cit p76. See also Perry
Ibid pp 276ff
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reform by the new Conservative government elected in 1970.
1973 Emplovment and Training Act
A government review of the operation of the 1964 Act was set
up in 1970, and its findings were published in the form of a
Green (Discussion) Paper in February 197258. The
recommendations of the review included the abolition of the
levy/grant funding system, the establishment of a government
sponsored 'Training Opportunities Scheme' (intended to offer
50-60,000 places by 1975 primarily to retrain adult workers),
and the setting up of a National Training Agency to run TOPS.
After consultation, however, the final Bill presented to
Parliament only tinkered with the levy/grant system, but
perhaps more importantly for the future of training provision,
did propose to set up an operationally independent central
agency to coordinate training between and outside the
individual ITBs.
The basis of the levy-funded ITBs was kept in place,
encouraging firms in particular industries to make provision
for training their own employees. Nonetheless, the
legislation allowed the ITBs to grant exemption for individual
firms from paying into the industry-wide pool used to fund
training provision. The exemption was to be given to firms
58 Training for the Future - A Plan for Discussion (London:
HMSO, 1972)
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offering satisfactory levels of training, it seems in order to
offset complaints about ITB bureaucracy and cost.
As for the newly created Manpower Services Commission -
designed to integrate training provision for people of all
ages with other mechanisms of intervention in the labor market
- it was originally split into two main divisions: on the one
hand the Employment Services Agency, planning and operating
schemes of public service employment (a function transferred
to the Department of Employment in 1974), and on the other the
Training Services Agency, promoting firm level training and
running the TOPS scheme, thereby unifying in terms of
oversight public and private training provision. As well as
executing national manpower policy under Ministerial guidance,
the MSC would also be an advisory body, offering advice on
trends in the labor market, and providing guidelines for
policy5 9.
By 1974, the Labour Party Manifesto for the February election
promised to turn the MSC "into a powerful body responsible for
the development and execution of a comprehensive manpower
policy" 60. What Labour had failed to take account of,
59 See M.Jackson 'A Seat at the Table?' pp 26-39 in C.Benn
and J.Fairley (eds) Challenging the MSC: On Jobs. Training and
Education (London: Pluto, 1986) p28ff
60 Quoted in Jackson Ibid p30
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however, was the major economic downturn that was to grip
Western Europe and America after 1973. From being largely a
planning agency, the political profile of the MSC was
dramatically raised in the search for quick solutions to the
mounting problem of unemployment. In terms of its direct
impact on training provision, however, the 1973 Act suffered
from the compromise it made with industry, which lobbied
against any transfer of power away from employers to national
government. As Sheldrake and Vickerstaff have written:
As in 1964, the 1973 Act was an attempt to reconcile the
need for a concerted national policy on training ¥ith the
entrenched and shortsighted interests of industry
Policy Proliferation 1974-79
The new economic order ushered in by the 1973 oil price
increases brought sustained depression to the UK labor market,
and had a profound effect on the level of youth unemployment,
providing for the first time a most visible and comprehensible
indicator of the failure of the British economy successfully
to integrate young people into the workforce. Time series
data show a long run secular increase in levels of youth
unemployment for the thirty years from the beginning of the
1950s, punctuated by structural breaks, leaps in fact, in the
trend, most obviously in 197462. By way of comparison, Hart
61 Sheldrake and Vickerstaff History of Industrial Training
op cit pp 45/6
62 See Hart Youth Unemployment in Great Britain op cit Ch2
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points out that while 1% of young people under the age of 18
were unemployed in 1951, the comparable figure for 1981 was
25%63. OECD data for British 16-24 year olds show the impact
of the 1974 depression on youth employment: unemployment rates
of 2.9% in 1970 and 3.2% in 1973 rose to 11.8% by 1976, and
13.5% in 197764.
Until 1975, the two major legislative influences on the
position of young people in the job market were the largely
indirect effects of the raising of the minimum school leaving
age (from 15 to 16) in 1974, and the delayed effects of the
provision for release of pupils from school for limited work
experience under the 1973 Education Act. However, in 1975,
continuing high levels of youth unemployment prompted the
government to instigate six new emergency programs of job
creation and training for young people. A brief review of the
different programs will give us some idea of the range of
measures taken65.
In 1975, the government used the model of the Temporary
Employment Subsidy (designed to stimulate job creation in
63 Hart Ibid pl
64 New Policies for the Young op cit p16
65 See S.Maclure Education and Youth Employment in Great
Britain (Berkeley: Carnegie Council on Policy Studies in Higher
Education, 1979) Ch 5 for more detail on the various programs
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depressed regions) to offer a Youth Employment Subsidy to
employers, designed to subsidize the wages of anyone under the
age of twenty registered as unemployed for over six months.
The explicit aim was to create short term employment. In more
direct fashion, the Job Creation Programme (JCP) tried to meet
rising political pressure by offering work for community
benefit at rates of pay equivalent to the going 'rate for the
job'. By March 1977, 75,000 jobs were being offered for an
average duration of 31 weeks, with one fifth of JCP
participants leaving to take a permanent job. It seems clear
that the main aim of the program was to keep people active:
the work was of a short term nature, offering limited
potential for personal development, and minimal training66
In the autumn of 1976, as youth unemployment reached record
levels, the government announced its intention to bolster its
efforts under the JCP with the creation of a new Work
Experience Programme (WEP). WEP offered six month work
placements for young people, and was seen by the MSC as a way
to give young people a better understanding of the work
environment. The original time limits on the program suggest
it was seen as a temporary expedient, with figures showing
66 A National Union of Teachers survey suggested that 77%
of the placements under JCP had no viable training content, and
although the MSC claimed that 70% of the jobs offered on the job
training, 70% of respondents in an MSC survey said they received
no training. Cited in Maclure Ibid p110
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only 10% of the jobs having a further education content, and
16% offering study on day release or formalized company
training67. The government also introduced two smaller
programs as variants of JCP and WEP: 1% of the 1976 JCP budget
was designated as 'pump priming' money to help new enterprises
start up, and the Clerical Training Awards Scheme was set up
as a sister scheme to WEP, offering specific training in
clerical studies.
Finally, also in 1976, the government proposed a "limited
program of experimental schemes of vocational preparation for
young people leaving school and entering jobs with little or
no training"6 8. Unified Vocational Preparation (UVP),
originally made up of 20 pilot schemes, aimed to link
education and training services in the planning and provision
of vocational preparation for young people. UVP was therefore
a more sophisticated variant of attempts to both supplement
basic skills and improve work habits.
It should be clear that in the 1970s not only was the ITB
system failing to offer the comprehensive training necessary
for a modern workforce, but that the government was
67 Maclure Ibid p113
68 M.Farley 'Trends and Structural Changes in English
Vocational Education' pp 73-94 in Dale op cit Education,
Training and Employment op cit p77
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overwhelmed by the demand to help young people find something
to do on leaving school. The rash of ad hoc, short term
programs started in response to political pressure made for
patchy provision, overlap between programs, and varying
allowances paid to young people. The programs both failed to
offer long term training, and to cope with the numbers of
young people without work. Nonetheless, there were signs that
the fundamental problems o the British approach to VET were
being recognized, and that the first steps towards a
thoroughgoing reorganization of attitudes and structures was
taking place. We will look at two aspects of the slowly
changing climate: first, and briefly, the 'Great Debate' on
education initiated by the Prime Minister in a speech at
Ruskin College, Oxford in late 197669, and secondly the
reorganization of training provision under the Youth
Opportunities Programme in 1977.
The significance of Mr Callaghan's Ruskin speech was that it
gave legitimacy to concerns at local and national level about
standards in education, and the relationship of teaching in
schools to the employment for which pupils were being
prepared. Many of the concerns about standards - most
obviously in the case of the so called 'Black Papers' - had a
distinctly political purpose, designed to discredit aspects of
69 Reprinted in Times Educational Supplement 22 October
1976 pl
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'progressive' teaching methods. Nonetheless, it is
significant that Mr Callaghan should have raised the idea of a
'core curriculum' of nationally prepared subjects for all
pupils as a way to establish minimum standards for school
leavers, providing a key link with the demands of several
groups for better links between education and industry7 0.
The long term aim of improving educational standards was no
substitute for a coherent government response to the crisis in
training and employment in the mid to late 1970s, however, and
the government made some attempt to rectify the problems of
the training system. Though the industry-based ITBs were kept
in operation, government action to help people falling through
the net took on a more planned hue with the publication and
implementation of proposals from the MSC's Holland Committee
for the establishment of a wide ranging Youth Opportunities
Programme (YOPs) to try and coordinate and rationalize the
variety of programs then in operation. Although the
government's basic role as provider of last resort was not
changed in favor of a more proactive approach, YOPs did at
least represent an attempt to help government perform its
backstop role more effectively.
70 For a useful analysis of the development of the 'schools
industry' movement, see I.Jamieson 'Corporate Hegemony or
Pedagogic Liberation? The Schools Industry Movement in England
and Wales' pp 23-39 in Dale (ed) Education, Training and
Employment op cit
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The scheme was originally floated by the then Education
Secretary Shirley Williams as a guarantee of education and/or
training to every unemployed young person under 18, but was
finally put together by the MSC in a bid to pre-empt the
Department of Education and Science (DES), which wanted to
operate a scheme through its network of LEAs. The MSC plan
offered a combination of work experience and training for
young people with six weeks unemployment behind them, with a
weekly allowance of 18 pounds per week for support. However,
the reliance on the private sector for job placements - 63% of
places were provided by private firms, compared to 26% from
public bodies and 10% from voluntary organizations71 - made
YOP trainees ripe for substitution for other workers, and the
concentration of placements in small firms severely limited
the content of the training provided72. Farley documents
further major criticisms of YOPs, relating to its failure to
stem the rise in unemployment, the inadequacy of the training
content, lack of provision for women and ethnic minorities,
and lack of trainee development within and from schemes.
71 Farley 'Trends and Structural Change' op cit p79
72 See Quality or Collapse (London: Youthaid, 1981)
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Summaz
This section has documented governmental response to the
weaknesses of British VET. Beyond the enduring strength, of
the voluntarist tradition in some parts of British industry
and politics, we have been able to isolate problems inherent
in the type of policy pursued in Britain. In the 1964
Industry Training Act, the government failed to integrate
training policy with other labor market measures, education
policy, or general economic policy. Instead, it sought to
isolate VET as the concern of industry, setting up a structure
that would last nearly twenty years. In 1973, a different
government sought to ameliorate the problems inherent in the
system with incremental reform of the ITB network. Finally,
in the period after 1975, we saw the government eact to
problems as they were identified, instead of planning ahead to
establish mechanisms to try and prevent the problems in the
first place. With this experience in mind, we will move on to
examine the American response to similar problems.
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2.1.2 THE. UNITED STATES 1962-1989
American public policy debates, to an even greater extent than
British, have been dominated by an ethic of limited government
and individual self-reliance. Whether one believes this to be
a reflection of individualist, anti statist sentiments among
the population at large, or instead a sign of a strong
business community forcing on government its antipathy to
interference with the market, it is widely held to be the case
that state intervention in America is less well developed than
in European or Scandinavian countries. Even where government
has agreed to take action, it has done so in such a way as
both to preserve private alternatives to state help, and to
erect state aid only as a last resort. This has been as true
for labor market policy as for legislation for income support,
health services, or tax policy73. We need to recognize,
however, the peculiarities of the American policy context
beyond the well documented weakness of state intervention.
Most importantly for an analysis of training policy, we should
be aware of America's economic situation and education system
in the post war period.
The United States emerged from the Second World War as the
preeminent world economic power, able and (in contrast to the
73 A valuable addition to the literature on the American
welfare state is A.S. Orloff, T.Skocpol and M.Weir (eds) The
Politics of American Social Policy (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1988). See esp Introduction, Chs 1,2,4,8,9
and Epilogue
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inter-war period) willing to take on a hegemonic" economic
role74 . Even seven years after the War's end, the American
economy produced 60% of total output in advanced capitalist
countries, with five times the export strength of Germany, and
seventeen times that of Japan75. Although US business was not
the prime beneficiary of the expansion of world trade after
1945 (German and Japanese export volume growth far exceeded
American levels, for instance), the sheer size of the American
economy, and full employment and growing wages at home, masked
underlying trends76 . For our purposes, the relevance of
absolutely strong but relatively weak US economic performance
is the complacency it induced in the 1950s. As we will see,
it was not until the early 1960s that the federal government
recognized the potential problems at the heart of US economic
performance. What is more, even today, concerns raised about
the US economy can still be brushed aside by national leaders.
A second key parameter of the transition from school to work
is, as we have seen, the education system. In the United
74 The notion is Kindleberger's. See C.Kindleberger The
World in Depression (Berkeley: California University Press,
1986)
75 Cited in P.Armstrong, A.Glyn and P.Harrison Capitalism
Since World War II: The Making and Break-Up of the Great Boom
(London: Fontana, 1984) p219
76 The rate of accumulation of American capital - crucial
to future investment - lagged behind European and Japanese
rivals, for instance. Armstrong, Glyn and Harrison report that
between 1955 and 1970, capital stock per head rose 38% in the
US, 87% in Europe and 203% in Japan. Armstrong, Glyn and
Harrison Ibid p219
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States, the system of mass higher education (or at least entry
to it) siphons off a large part of the school-leaving
population. Although about 15% of young people in an American
age cohort do not graduate from high school, or receive a GED,
some 60% of high school graduates (50% of the cohort) do go on
to college77. Policies for youth training have in general
been directed at the "other" 50%, and in keeping with our
approach to British policy, we will concentrate attention here
on that part of the cohort that does not continue in education
on leaving school. Despite the expanding opportunities for
study in community colleges78, and the places available for
young people in vocational and business schools, significant
numbers of school leavers fall through the various safety
nets, and find themselves unemployed or in temporary unskilled
employment on leaving school.
Before proceeding to examine federal initiatives in the field
of youth VET, it is important to recognize the limitations of
an approach that relies almost exclusively on analysis of
federal legislation. The American system does of course
77 See P.Osterman Emplovment Futures: Reorganisation.
Dislocation and Public Policy (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1988) p114
78 Between 1960 and 1980, enrollment at community colleges
increased from 650,000 to 4 million, or from 16% of high school
enrollees in 1960 to 38% in 1983. Cited in Osterman Ibid p101.
See also Competence and Competition op cit pp 29ff and Dertouzos
et al Made in America op cit p85.
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devolve significant power to state and local government, and
the exact nature of provision of youth VET is not invariant
between States. Nevertheless, in the field of manpower
policy, it has been federal government that has set the
parameters of debate and laid down the framework for public
action, often delegating power over the implementation of
policy to lower levels of government. The aim of this thesis
is to get an overall picture of public policy for youth VET,
and so study of federal policy does serve our purposes
reasonably well. Further detailed study of selected states
would of course furnish useful detail on the state of VET
provision, but would not in my estimation contradict the basic
thrust of my case79.
Early Training Initiatives and the War on Poverty
As in Britain, the first attempts by American government to
improve the training of the workforce were directed at all
unemployed workers, and not just school leavers. Also, rising
unemployment does seem to have been a key trigger for action
for American politicians as well as British ones. Baumer and
Van Horne are of course right to point out that there is no
one 'unacceptable' level of unemployment: the level of
unemployment at which government feels forced to act can be
79 Study of state level initiatives currently seems to take
the form of analysis of individual programs, not examination of
overall provision. For references see footnote 108
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seen as a social construct, dependent on the prevailing
political balance of forces. Thus, while an overall
unemployment rate of 7.8% in 1950 produced no emergency jobs
program, rates of unemployment of 6.6% and 6.7% in 1971 and
1974 respectively did lead Congress to pass emergency job
creation measures8 0. Nonetheless it seems widely accepted that
the Kennedy administration was prompted into action by rising
rates of unemployment that broke the 8% barrier in 196181.
Although the initial policies were not aimed specifically at
the young unemployed, disproportionately high rates of youth
unemployment made young people a large part of the target
population of programs aiming to help the unemployed 82
While income support and job creation or temporary employment
measures can be used to cushion the blow of unemployment for
those people suffering temporary unemployment, the Kennedy
/Johnson Administrations seem to have recognized the need to
affect more structural change in the position of the long term
unemployed, people whose skills (or lack of them) consign them
80 Baumer and Van Horn The Politics of Unemployment op cit
p21
81 On the origins of the labor market policies in the early
1960s see Baumer and Van Horn Politics of Unemployment op cit
pl6ff and G.Mangum and J.Walsh A Decade of Manpower Development
and Training (Salt Lake City: Olympus Publishing Co, 1973)
82 Double digit unemployment has been the norm for North
American 16-19 year olds since 1954. See H.Ginsburg Full
Employment and Public Policy: The US and Sweden (Lexington, HA:
D.C. Heath and Co., 1983) p39
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to near permanent reliance on state support. The first such
piece of legislation passed in the 1960s was the Manpower
Development and Training Act (MDTA), which proposed to spend a
modest $64 million in 1963 on programs to help retrain workers
displaced from work by technological change.
However, when growing pressure from the civil rights movement
prompted President Johnson to launch his war on poverty in
1964, the role of the MDTA was drastically changed. Not for
the last time in the history of training policy in America,
political pressure would overwhelm the original impetus of a
training program in favor of more short term goals. The
division between the long term goals of training and the
shorter term ones of job creation seem to have crystallized in
the divergent concerns of, on the one hand, the Office of
Education, which saw education and training as a means and an
end, and on the other the Department of Labor whose focus was
on job creation wherever possible. President Johnson's
declaration of war on poverty turned MDTA towards an anti-
poverty orientation, incorporating a number of job creation
programs, like the Concentrated Employment Program, under its
rubric. Thus, Mangum and Walsh report that while MDTA
obligations - expenditures plus certified unpaid obligations -
doubled between 1966 and 1971, resources devoted to training
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increased by only 9%83.
The determination to help the disadvantaged did focus
attention on the position of youth, and spawned a host of
programs for youth activity, most obviously the Neighborhood
Youth Corps, the Apprentice Outreach Program, and the Job
Corps. The latter has survived to the present day, and is
generally agreed to be cost beneficial. It offers
comprehensive programs of occupational skill training, basic
and remedial education, counselling and job training for
disadvantaged youth. Although information is not available on
the relative performance of its component parts, at an
aggregate level a recent study found that in the three and a
half years after participation, enrollees' earnings were 28%
higher than those of non participants, and their time on
welfare was cut by 2 weeks per year84 . The Job Corps is
notable for its relative success because the other initiatives
of the 1960s did little to establish relevant mechanisms for
the vocational education of American school leavers. The
recognition of the need for a national initiative in the early
1970s is testimony to that.
83 Mangum and Walsh Decade of Manpower op cit pll
84 C.L.Betsey, R.Hollister and M.Papageorgiou (eds) for
Committee on Youth Employment Programs, Committee on Behavioural
and Social Sciences and Education, and the National Research
Council Youth Employment and Training: The YEDPA Years
(Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1985)
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CETA Marks I and II
By the time of President Nixon's major policy statement on
manpower policy in March 1971, vocational education was
provided under 17 separate programs through more than 50,000
education and community organizations. Nixon described these
programs in his statement as overcentralized, bureaucratic,
remote from the people they mean to serve, overguidelined and
far less effective than they might be in helping the unskilled
and the disadvantaged" 85. The aim of all concerned actors was
to reorder this patchwork set of programs into a streamlined
and consolidated system. Key differences separated the
Democratically controlled Congress from President Nixon,
however, most obviously relating to the role of public sector
employment (PSE) in the program, and the extent to which power
would be devolved to state and local government. In its final
form, CETA - the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act -
embodied these differences in its vagueness, allowing all the
conflicting groups to believe that it would serve their ends.
Thus, CETA passed operational power to 450 'Prime Sponsors' -
mainly state and local government units of over 100,000 people
- with the shape of each program also determined locally, but
subject to monitoring by federal government and local advisory
councils of concerned citizens.
85 'Manpower Revenue Sharing Message' pp419-422 in Weekly
Compilation of Presidential Documents March 8 1971, quoted in
Baumer and Van Horn Politics of Unemployment op cit p18
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The tensions in the making of the Act are evident in its six
Titles. The provision of comprehensive services for the
unemployed and economically disadvantaged authorized provision
by Prime Sponsors, but did not guarantee it, and left open
whether services would consist of classroom training, on the
job training, work experience, PSE, or support services.
Thus, while opportunities for reform existed, the Act did not
determine either whether the reforms would actually take
effect at local level or what results would be achieved. The
other Titles tinkered with the edges of this compromise: PSE
was authorized in areas of substantial unemployment (taken to
be a rate of over 6.5%); target groups, including youth, were
established; the Job Corps was reauthorized as an independent
program; an advisory group was set up to make recommendations
on manpower policy to the President; and finally a further
emergency jobs program was authorized in 1974 in an amendment
to CETA to provide temporary jobs in the public sector. The
potential for local discretion can be gauged by the fact that
while the possible recruits mumbered 27 million people,
funding was provided for only two million places. The
discretion on who to serve was compounded by ambiguity about
how to serve those selected. We can now see how this
ambiguity allowed the training content of CETA to be relegated
in the face of other short term political priorities.
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Aggregate figures give some indication of the rapidly changing
shape of CETA in its first four years of operation. The Title
1 training component of the Act accounted for 42% of total
expenditures in 1975, but only 23% in the following year86.
CETA became synonymous with PSE, funds for which increased
from $1.5 billion in FY 1975 to $4.5 billion in FY 197887. As
Baumer and Van Horn note:
The goal of improving the skills and job opportunities of
disadvantaged people was ovgwhelmed by the urge to have the
unemployed on the PSE rolls
This shift in the purpose of CETA was primarily the result of
newly elected President Carter's political and economic
strategy, though the seeds of the change had been sown much
earlier. Unemployment had reached 7% by the time of his
inauguration in January 1977, and within a few days of taking
office, Carter had unveiled a $31 billion package of public
spending to stimulate the economy, doubling the PSE rolls from
300,000 to 600,000 places in the six months after May 197789.
Any notion that experience in these jobs armed par.tcipants
with skills for other jobs seems misplaced: in 1975 and 1976,
75% of PSE placements were in unskilled service and clerical
86 Baumer and Van Horn Politics of Unemployment op cit p95
87 Baumer and Van Horn Ibid p89
88 Baumer and Van Horn Ibd p102
89 Baumer and Van Horn Ibid p9102
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occupations90. Furthermore, studies suggest that half of all
PSE jobs were not newly created employment, but instead simply
substituted for recruitment that would have taken place
anyway91. By 1978, an enduring paradox in job creation policy
came to the fore. By virtue of its very success in taking
people off the unemployment rolls, CETA took the heat out of
political demands for help for the unemployed. In 1978,
unemployment dipped below 6% for the first time since 1974,
raising discussion about the continuing need for such a large
jobs program. At the same time, as CETA came up before
Congress for reauthorization, difficulties inherent in the
implementation of a crash program drastically tainted CETA's
reputation. Images of abuse and mismanagement - from fraud to
the funding of jobs in exotic project areas - dominated media
coverage, and provoked a reaction against the job creation
content of CETA. This reaction did not, however, result in
any significant reorganisation of CETA to return it to its
original purpose - the training of the long term unemployed.
The reauthorization of CETA led to two major types of change
in the program. First, although the Prime Sponsor structure
90 Baumer and Van Horn Ibid p76
91 See A.Fechter Public Employment Programs (Washington,
DC: American Enterprise Institute, 1975). Also G.E. Johnson and
J.D.Tomola 'The Fiscal Substitution Effects of Alternative
Approaches to PSE' pp 3-26in Journal of Human Resources Vol 12,
Number 1 (Winter 1977)
63
of existing programs was left unchanged, substantial efforts
were made to crack down on abuse, with stricter eligibility
criteria, increased federal oversight, and stronger penalties
against those misusing funds. In other words, a program that
was launched as a decentralized answer to the malign influence
of an overweening federal bureaucracy was given new
centralizing administrative content. Paradoxically, however,
responsibility for CETA was split up between four discrete
national agencies. In addition to the original core training
and remedial education function of CETA (previously Title I),
the reauthorized CETA included continued provision for PSE, a
new role for the private sector, and expanded programs for
youth. A new Title VII set up Private Industry Councils, made
up of local businessmen, to help generate training
opportunities and work experience for the economically
disadvantaged, and under Title IV summer and experimental
youth programs were set up alongside the Job Corps to help
disadvantaged youth. Despite their separate operation,
however, and separate legislative authorization, each program
with the exception of PSE adopted similar clients and
strategies, as well as objectives. The jungle of programs
aimed at youth was not only made up of residues of MDTA and
CETA, however. In 1977, President Carter initiated a further
set of programs independent of the others. The programs
authorized under YEDPA - the Youth Employment Demonstration
Projects Act - further confused America's 'non-system' of VET.
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Youth Employment Demonstration Proects Act 1977
YEDPA was the last part of President Carter's early barrage of
legislation, adding four new programs - Young Adult
Conservation Corps, Youth Community Conservation and
Improvement Project, Youth Employment and Training Program,
and experimental programs of wage subsidy for disadvantaged
young people in the form of the Youth Incentive Entitlement
Pilot Project - to the preexisting programs aimed at youth,
namely the Job Corps and the Summer Youth Program. The
tripartite report of the Committee on Youth Employment
Programs, the Commission on Behavioural and Social Science and
Education, and the NRC locates the "primary motivation" for
these programs in the high relative unemployment rates of the
late 1970s, and this concern is evident in the shape of the
programs. Although over $8 billion was spent from 1979 to 1982
(compared to $955 million in the last pre YEDPA year) 92 , the
major stress on short term, part time work experience in
public or non profit agencies represented little change from
the strategy of the Neighborhood Youth Corps in 1965.
Furthermore, although substantial numbers of young people did
take part in YETP (413,000 in 1979 and 463,000 in 1980), the
emphasis was on counseling and information provision, not
skills training, which remained the preserve of employers. It
92 Cited in V.B. Briggs 'Youth Employment and Training
Programs: A Review' pp 137-140 in Industrial and Labor Relations
Review Vol 41 No 1 (October 1987) p138
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is clear that in addition to raising the profile of the youth
unemployment problems, YEDPA severely complicated the choices
open to young people. In Hartford, Connecticut, for instance,
in 1980, Baumer and Van Horn report that six organizations,
each authorized through a separate program with separate
regulations and reporting requirements, operated part time
temporary employment programs for low income minority
teenagers.
The Job Training Partnership Act 1982
The innovations undertaken by Mrs Thatcher's administrations
in the 1980s (which we will examine in the third section of
this chapter) are all the more striking when compared to
policies pursued by her ideological soul-mates in the United
States. Despite the election of an avowedly radical
President, American policy for youth training has remained
broadly within the bounds of a consensus established in the
1960s. As Osterman writes:
The training institutions created during the War on
Poverty have been retained, in sharply diminished
dimensions, and now deliver services very similar to
those of the past under the aegis of Reagan's Job
Training Partnership Act (JTPA)
The vocational education institutes established in the early
twentieth century, and the Employment Service created during
the New Deal, continue to operate side by side with a jungle
93 Osterman Employment Futures op cit p10
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of federal and state programs for the young unemployed94. The
lack of federal reform in this field in the 1980s is all the
more remarkable in view of the country's deep economic
troubles, manifested most clearly in the trade deficit, and in
the light of compelling evidence suggesting that new
generations of American workers are not entering the labor
market with the skills required for high quality production in
the 1990s. Following a brief review of these statistics -
they represent, after all, obvious potential stimuli to
government action - we will move on to examine the limited
nature of policy development in the 1980s.
The unemployment rate among 16-19 year olds peaked at 21.5% in
December 198195, and even after five years of economic growth
still stood at 14.8% for whites and 37.6% for blacks in March
94 Osterman reports on the poor performance of the
potentially important Employment Service, which should help
match job seekers with job vacancies, but which has become
increasingly tied to the income transfer system through
requirements on welfare recipients to show themselves looking
for employment. See P.Osterman 'Rethinking the American
Training System' pp 28-35 in Social Policy Vol 19 No 1 (Summer
1988) p30. On the failure of the Employment Service to help
place unemployed people in work see T.Johnson, K.Dickinson and
R.West 'An Evaluation of the Impact of Employment Service
Referrals on Applicant Earnings' pp 112-138 in Journal of Human
Resources Vol 20 No 4 (Winter 1985)
95 Cited in S.F.Hamilton and J.F.Claus 'Youth Unemployment
in the US: Problems and Programmes' pp 137-160 in R.Fiddy (ed)
Youth Unemployment and Training: A Collection of National
Perspectives (London: Falmer Press, 1985) p142
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198896. The evidence on the deficiencies of young Americans
entering the labor market seems uncontested. In 1983, the
National Commission on Excellence in Education produced its
report A Nation at Risk calling attention to the problems of
American education and the threat they posed to national
competitiveness. The MIT Commission on Industrial
Productivity noted a "systematic undervaluation...of how much
difference it can make when people are well educated and their
skills are continually developed and challenged" 97, and David
Kearns, Chairman and CEO of Xerox Corporation has said that
"the American workforce is running out of qualified people"98.
Even the President of the American Federation of Teachers,
Albert Shanker, says:
We've never really educated more than 15% to 20% of the
kids in this country - not (even) up to the level of
Shakespeare or Dickens or calculus or trigonomey , but
just up to the level of writing a simple letter'
The American school system is of course even more
decentralized than the British (which is rapidly being
centralized as the provisions of the 1988 Education Reform Act
take effect), the curriculum being decided by state agencies
and some 15,000 local school districts, with federal money
96 Cited in P.Osterman 'Rethinking the American Training
System' op cit p28
97 Dertouzos et al Made in America op cit p82
98 Quoted in Miller 'Employers Wrestle ' op cit p49 ck
99 Quoted in Miller Ibid p50
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accounting for less than 9% of total expendituresl . However,
the federal government has taken minimal strides to cater for
the needs of school leavers, and this is our main concern.
Ronald Reagan entered office with a level of distrust of
government and confidence in the market similar to Mrs
Thatcher. CETA was due to expire in September 1982, prompting
discussion about how the Act's training provisions should be
replaced. Levitan and Gallo's detailed account of the birth
of the JTPA identifies four issues of controversy: how much to
spend; stipend levels for enrollees; the extent of the federal
role; and the degree of business involvement101 . Despite an
unemployment rate of 9% in January 1982, President Reagan
proposed to spend only $2.4 billion on job training, one
quarter of the pre (1980) election level. While the final
compromise raised this figure to $3.7 billion in the JTPA's
first full year (half the 1980 CETA level), support services
(including stipends) and administration by local sponsors
could not exceed 30% of total costs - ostensibly the
Administration professed determination not to allow JTPA to
become a welfare program. The JTPA earmarked 40% of funds for
low income and long term unemployed youth, with public service
jobs prohibited. In theory at least, the local government
100 Cited in Levitan and Gallo Training for Jobs op cit p49
101 Lvitan and Gallo Ibid pp 10ff
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base of the CETA Prime Sponsor network was to be replaced with
newly created Service Delivery Areas (SDAs) comprising local
governments and locally organized Private Industry Councils
(PICa), but in fact the legacies of the CETA framework were
taken on in substantial numbers: for instance, some 80% of
SDAs left CETA Prime Sponsor boundaries unchanged or were
hybrids of two or more Prime Sponsor areasl02.
The new Act did, however, shift the balance of responsibility
away from central government, partly to the states but in
large part straight to the private sector: As President Reagan
said, "You, the private employers, will lead, not the federal
government" 103. On the basis of 15 months "intense" work on
the replacement of CETA, the US Chamber of Commerce claims
that the House added three out of five amendments to the
legislation supported by the Administration and employersl04
and that "the Act places the leadership of these public
training programs and facilities in the hands of local
employers who know what skills are needed and what jobs are
available in the communities" 105. Like the Thatcher government
in the UK, the Reagan Administration trusted the atomized
102 Baumer and Van Horn Politics of Unemployment op citp182
103 Quoted in The New Job Training Partnership Act
(Washington: US Chamber of Commerce, 1983) p81
104 The New JTPA Ibid p4
105 The New JTPA Ibid 'Foreward'
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decisions of individual firms to facilitate the provision of
training places. It also provided for collective business
influence at a local level by setting up PICs - comprised of a
majority of businessmen - to promote local initiatives. As
the Chamber of Commerce pointed out:
The partnership provides an ideal PR forum, a place where
people can work out programs and activities over a period
of time and share in the credit for the results. Many
business firms will want to participate in the
partnership to obtain, trained, productive employees. As
they do, they will acquif both well trained employees
and favorable visibility
Nonetheless, the programs remain marginal to the main
activities of the business community: a Bureau of National
Affairs survey revealed that only 9% of firms had any
involvement with JTPA1 07. The "partnership" referred to above
is with state and local government - the Act having paved the
way for Administration officials progressively to attenuate
the federal role in job training. Although the Act severely
106 The New JTPA Ibid p74
107 Cited in Osterman EmDloyment Futures op cit p99
108 Symptomatic of President's early concern to decentralize
labor market policy was the introduction of an amendment to the
1967 Work Incentive Program (through the 1981 Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act) which gave States the option of fulfilling
the requirements of the 1967 Act by developing their own 'work
to welfare' programs. This option has been taken up in a number
of states, most innovatively in Massachusetts in the form of its
now famous 'ET' (Employment Training) Program. These programs
have not been primarily directed at school leavers, but have
located the young unemployed as a target group. On the results
of these programs, see Work and Welfare: An Analysis of AFDC
Employment Programs in Four States (Washington: US General
Accounting Office, 1988) and J.Gueron Work Initiatives for
Welfare Recipients (New York: Manpower Development Research
Corporation, 1985). On the Massachusetts' program, see
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limited the ambit of federal responsibility for the program,
it did give the government a role in financing and monitoring
state and local government compliance with the law, supplying
technical assistance, assessing the success of the program,
and ensuring fiscal accountability. However, Levitan and
Gallo report that "virtually all observers agree that the
Labor Department abjured leadership of the program", and that
the Administration judged the program a success merely by the
fact that the federal government had been removed from the
scene109 . Furthermore, although the Act required the annual
submission to Congress of assessments of JTPA operation,
Levitan and Gallo report that the Labor Department ignored
this statutory requirement until 1987 and that no record could
be found of Congress prompting it to do so110 .
At state level, too, there is evidence that state government
has been reticent to become involved with JTPA: financial
contributions have been limited, less than two-thirds of
federally provided set-aside funds have been spent, and public
sector (as well as trade union and community group)
involvement in the advisory councils (PICs and State Job
S.Savner, L.Williams and M.Halas 'The Massachusetts ET Program'
pp 122-131 in Clearinghouse Review June 1986
109 Levitan and Gallo Training for Jobs op cit p28.
110 Levitan and Gallo Ibid p28
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Training Coordinating Councils) limited111
Available evidence does suggest that overall JTPA participants
do have better employment and wage rates than their peers, but
no greater improvement than participants in the CETA
programs112 . As for the year round youth programs offered in
1985, they involved some 500,000 young people under the age of
22, 31% of whom were given help in job search, 81% offered
work experience, 31% on the job training and 39% classroom
teaching. Evidence on the results of this involvement is
extremely patchy - nonexistent in fact. The Job Corps doubled
its numbers to 40,000 under YEDPA, generally aiming to help
the most disadvantaged young people through long term programs
(up to a year) of on the job and classroom training at
residential centers linked to employers. By 1987, the Job
Corps helped 100,000 enrollees through 105 centers, and
despite proposals from President Reagan to cut the program
spends over $15,000 per trainee (by way of comparison, the
public schools spend less than $5000 per pupil). As a solution
to the broader problems faced by disadvantaged youth, however,
the Job Corps is only a start - there are after all over 6.5
million poor 15-24 year olds in the US.
111 Levitan and Gallo Ibid pp 30ff
112 See Levitan and Gallo Ibid pp 98ff
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Summary
Although it is an accepted cliche to call American VET a vast
'non-system'113 , it is possible to discern three types of
program established by the American government that aim to
help those American youth whom the education system fails to
prepare for work. Following Hill and Nixon114, we can see
these categories as first, programs for employability
development of all ages, like the MDTA; secondly, work
experience and training programs for youth, like some of the
YEDPA programs; and finally, policies of tax credit for
employers hiring the structurally unemployed, like the 1977
Targeted Jobs Tax Credit, that we have so far not mentioned.
However, as we have seen, no such easy division between
programs is evident at ground level. Attempts to offer clear
options for young people keen to receive vocational education
manifestly failed in the 1960s and 1970s: taken together,
these failures have indeed made for what Richard Kazis has
called a "gaping hole in the web of institutional arrangements
that provide for a transition from school to work"115. In
similar vein, the MIT Industrial Productivity Commission
pointed out that "there is no systematic path to training for
113 Competence and Competition op cit
114 R.B. Hill and R.Nixon Youth Employment in American
Industry (New York: Transaction Books, 1984) p51
115 R.Kazis 'The Relationship between Education and
Productivity' op cit p47
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the non college bound" 116 , and it is this failure to initiate
structural change towards the goal of an encompassing
education and training system that marks out the American
experience. As Osterman has explained:
... the system is a haphazard collection of agencies of
widely differing quality, some good but others very poor,
but the main point is that there is no expectation that
it will be different. In ep-ct, the unevenness is
designed into the structure
116 Dertouzos et al Made in America op cit p83
117 Osterman EmDlovment Futures op cit p98
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B. Structured Intervention
2.2.1 WEST GRMANY
Relative and absolute levels of youth unemployment have been
consistently lower in West Germany than in other OECD
countries118. At the same time, we have already noted that 60%
of the German workforce possesses an intermeaiate level
vocational qualification, and we know that German economic
performance in the post war period has been very impressive.
For many people, the common factor linking these statistics is
the highly structured system of VET that channels young people
from school to work in West Germany. Notwithstanding cultural
and institutional peculiarities on which the system rests, the
German experience offers relevant lessons for other countries,
and is presented here as exemplary of an alternative to the ad
hocery of the American and British approach 1 9. It may be
worth stressing that the German 'model' should not be seen as
a blueprint for other countries, but rather should be used to
view issues of VET from a new perspective.
German policy for the transition from school to work affects
German schoolchildren from an early age, with streaming from
118 For figures from 1970-82, see New Policies for the Young
op cit p18
119 As Osterman has written: "The German system is ordered,
logical, and essentially universal. The American system is
chaotic and idiosyncratic". See Osterman Empnloyment Futures op
cit p114
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the age of 10, four years after entry into compulsory
schooling. Despite the autonomy of the (eleven) States with
regard to educational policy, structures of educational
provision are relatively invariant across the country12 0.
Thus, secondary education is split into three branches: the
Hauptschule, from which pupils are destined for an
apprenticeship at age 16 in West Germany's extensive 'dual
system' (see below); the Mittelschule (also called
Realschule), an intermediary school that ends at 16 but from
which some pupils do go on to higher education; and finally
the Gymnasium, where pupils stay until age 18 and then
generally go on to university. There is some disagreement
about the exact numbers of students in each branch, but a
split of 40:30:30 would not be wide of the mark2 1. In terms
of curriculum, there is a sharp contrast between the classical
leanings of the Gymnasium (two foreign languages are
compulsory, for instance), and the industrial bent of the
Hauptschule, where 4 periods a week are set aside from age 13
(8 periods for 15 and 16 year olds) for 'Arbeitslehre'
120 For instance, only 4% of German school leavers graduated
from comprehensive schools in 1982, and even in Berlin, which
departs most radically from the set pattern, only one quarter of
all pupils are enrolled in comprehensive schools. See Prais and
Wagner 'Schooling Standards in England and Germany' op cit p53
121 See S.Maclure 'An Industrial Education Lesson for the
UK?' in Times Educational Supplement 1st February 1985, p; H-
G.Betz 'Vocational Education and Qualifications in West Germany'
(Unpublished Mimeo, Center for International Studies, MIT, 1988)
pp 2ff; Prais and Wagner Ibid p54ff
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(literally 'work tuition').
At age 16, 70% of every cohort of West German 16 year olds
move into the highly regulated 'dual system' of education and
work experience that lies at the heart of school to work
policy (over 90% are either in the dual system, full time
vocational schools, or full time training institutions until
age 18). It is noteworthy, however, that increasing numbers
of German young people seem to be progressing further up the
educational ladder: from 1960 to 1980, the number of school
leavers going no further than the compulsory schooling level
dropped from 75% to 47%, the number with an intermediate
certificate rose from 16% to 36%, and the number of Abitur
holders (gained at 18) rose from 9% to 17% of the cohort 22.
Furthermore, in the key engineering sector, German education
is far outstripping Britain and the US. Per head of
population, West Germany is producing 300 more doctorates in
engineering than the UK, twice as many Masters' Degress,
50,000 more BAs, 200,000 more technicians, and 80,000 more
craftsmen123 . At the same time, we should also recognize that
for six years before 1987, the aggregate supply of training
122 See K.Schober 'Youth Employment in West Germany' pp 113-
148 in B.G.Reubens (ed) Youth at Work: An International Survey
(New Jersey: Rowman and Allenheld, 1983) p115
123 See S.J.Prais 'Qualified Manpower in Engineering:
Britain and Other Industrially Advanced Countries' pp 76-83 in
NIER No 127 (February 1989)
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places in the dual system nationwide failed to meet aggregate
demand24.
On the basis of the 1969 Federal Vocational Training Act and
the 1981 Federal Vocational Training Promotion Act,
apprentices in the dual system spend two to three years
attached to a company, where their work is supervised by a
qualified instructor, with day or block release in a
vocational school, where they are taught the theory of their
trade by specially trained teachers. Their status is legally
defined as that of apprentices and they work in any one of 450
occupations according to formal training contracts. The
dropout rate is less than 5%, and over 90% of a cohort pass
the final exams. Although the unemployment rate after
apprenticeship was only 1.6% in 1980, it had risen to 8.8% in
1983125 (still below American and British levels).
The content of the training - and issues pertaining to
remuneration, social benefits, and training facilities - is
decided at a national level by the tripartite Federal
Institute of Vocational Training, a government agency
supervised by and responsible to the Federal Ministry of
124 Figures from 'West Germany: Youth Training' European
Industrial Relations Review 179 (December 1988) p14
125 Figures from D.Marsden, C.Trinder and K.Wagner 'Measures
to Reduce Youth UNemployment in Britain, France and West
Germany' pp 43-52 in NIER No 117 (August 1986) p47
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Education and Science (in notable comparison to the KSC's
operation as an arm of the DE in Britain). In addition to the
publication of research and statistics, the Institute devises
training plans which lay out what an apprentice needs to be
taught in each of the 400 plus occupations in the dual
system - interim and final exams test whether the apprentice
has acquired the necessary theoretical and practical knowledge
to work independently in the trade. Implementation of the
Federal plans and monitoring of their operation is the
responsibility of 250 local "competent authorities", which are
often based on Chambers of Industry and Commerce or Craft
Chambers. These "competent authorities" also keep a check on
training instructors, organize exams, keep lists of
apprentices in an area, and advise companies on training
matters.
A major theme in this thesis is an emphasis on the importance
of program structure, even to the relative exclusion of
matters like funding levels. This is no less true for the
German system, whose basically sound structure - whether or
not one agrees with the thrust of policy, it cannot be denied
that the German system seems to achieve its goals
effectively - allows it to serve different needs at different
times. Most impressively, in comparison to other programs,
the dual system has been able to cope relatively smoothly with
the increased demand for places arising from bulging youth
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cohorts and economic depression in the 1980s.
Between 1970 and 1984, largely as a result of government
promotion of the dual system, the number of apprentices
increased by one third to 1.7 million, made up by 61% males
and 39% females1 26 . It would be wrong to romanticize the
reasons for some of the support in the early 19708 for a '10th
educational year', to be made up of vocational preparation or
continued education. At the same time, what is noteworthy is
that various government schemes to alleviate the pressure: of
economic depression on unemployment totals - for instance the
Labor Promotion Law (Arbeitsforderungsgesetz, or AFG) - could
be contained within the basic structure of the dual system.
Similarly, the important attempt at innovation in the form of
an 'extra' basic vocational training year
(Berufsgrundbildungsjahr, or BGJ) for school leavers, which
aimed to despecialize initial vocational education and more
closely integrate general and vocational tuition, was quite
compatible with the basic operation of the dual system - if
anything, it would enhance it1 27. Furthermore, although the
126 Marsden, Trinder and Wagner Ibid p46
127 Although it enrolled a quarter of all apprentices when
it first started in the 1970s, Schober reports that the refusal
of many employers to recognize the BGJ as a first training year
has turned it into something of a "waiting room" for school
leavers. In 1980, the BGJ covered some 13% of all school
leavers aiming for apprenticeship, with about half the young
people leaving the program finding an apprenticeship place. See
Schober 'Youth Employment' op cit p117
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system has been built around the acquisition of fairly
discrete, specific skills, there is recognition of the need to
promote integration of previously separate tasks, and
curricula changes are slowly taking account of this12 8.
At a local level, there is unquestionable business power and
influence over the operation of the schemes. Businesses pay
for the bulk of the training themselves - to the tune of DM20
billion in 1986, compared to DM7 billion of public money - and
organized in the mid 1970s to defeat a proposal from the
Social Democratic government to levy a fine on firms offering
less than their share of training. At the same time, sound
business sense prompts businesses to recognize the need to
invest in training for at least two reasons. First, in the
words of the Chairman of the Commission on the Cost of VET:
Large employers feel a strong need to mould young people
as early as p ible to promote the 'right kind' of
socialisation
Second, Dr Dorothea Wilms, Christian Democrat Secretary of
State for Education and Science in the early 1980s, explains
that:
128 In 1985 the government launched a "qualifications
offensive" to keep skill standards up to date. See Betz
'Vocational Education' op cit p20ff
129 Quoted in Competence and Competition op cit p13
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The motivation and goals of German industry and commerce
for comprehensive education and training activities
derive from the belief that investment is necessary in
order to optimise production and syices to maintain
competitiveness in the marketplace
Although only some 16% of German companies participate in the
dual system, they employ between 60% and 80% of the German
workforce. Aside from the ties of tradition and culture,
important though these are131, we need to find other reasons to
explain why British employers seem much more reticent to offer
suitable training than their German counterparts. This is a
theme we return to in chapter 3.
In the meantime, a cautionary word is indicated. First, the
West German dual system seems to suffer from the same problems
of the division of training by gender that plague programs in
other countries too. A 1986 survey reported recently by the
EuroDean Institute for Industrial Relations showed that
despite the 400 plus occupations on offer, 48% of male
trainees were enrolled as vehicle mechanics, electricians,
fitters, painters, carpenters, gas/water engineers or clerical
employees and fully 68% of all females were enrolled as
130 Quoted in Competence and Competition Ibid p12
131 An OECD report points out that in the three countries
where medieval apprenticeship systems have been tailored to meet
modern needs - namely Germany, Austria and Switzerland - young
people are significantly less likely to suffer
disproportionately high unemployment rates. See S.Williams et
al Youth Without Work: Three Countries Aroach the Problem
(Paris: OECD, 1981)
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hairdressers, sales assistants, clerical employees, assistants
in fresh food shops, or doctor's/dentist's assistants 32.
Furthermore, links from the success of the dual system to low
youth unemployment can be drawn too hastily. We should not
forget that German macroeconomic and labor market management
in the 1970s included the repatriation of some 730,000 migrant
workers between 1973 and 1978, and the encouragement of early
retirement by labor force participants between the ages of 58
and 65, dropping participation rates among that age group from
75% in 1970 to 40% by 1979 among men and 23% to 11% among
women133 . Both of these measures contributed significantly to
opening up job opportunities for young people, and therefore
keeping unemployment totals down.
Nonetheless, the German model does offer a stark contrast with
British and American policy (or lack of it). As such, it
helps us understand the potential for integrated policy
making, appreciate the missed opportunities in Britain and the
US, and perhaps learn lessons for policy-making in the 1990s.
132 European Industrial Relations Review 'Youth Training'
op cit p14
133 See Moon, Webber and Richardson 'Linking Policy Areas'
op cit p168. Comparable figures in the UK were 87% to 76% among
men and 52% to 55% among women
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2.2.2 SWEDEN
Even the briefest glance at the Swedish approach to the
transition from school to work reminds us of the importance of
overall economic strategy to the position of young people in
the economy. Social Democratic governments in Sweden have
made full employment the central goal of economic policy in
the post war period, and strong macroeconomic performance has
helped keep unemployment low (see Appendix 2). Dating back to
the Rehn-Meidner model of the 1940s, active labor market
policy (now accounting for 6% of total government expenditure)
and extensive commitment to high quality education (costing 8%
of GDP) has played a key part in promoting economic growth.
It has been combined with restrictive fiscal policy,
relatively low profit levels and solidaristic wage policies to
channel capital and workers into growth sectors of the
economy. The education and training system has been crucial
to the mobility at the heart of this system, arming workers
with skills that can be applied in different circumstances.
Although the country is quite different in terms of size,
racial homogeneity and economic power from the other countries
under examination, it is nonetheless useful to be aware of the
approach to youth VET in Sweden.
Rehn has identified three trends determining employment and
unemployment rates in the period since 1945: first, changes in
economic activity, mitigated by active labor market policy;
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second the growing rate of relative youth unemployment (due
above all to the decline in demand for young labor and
tempered by the effect of special government measures); and
finally, the pronounced expansion of secondary schools and
institutes of higher education 34. In this section, we will
concentrate attention on education and training provision.
On the basis of a 1962 Law, compulsory schooling lasts from
ages seven to sixteen, and is in the main comprehensive (ie:
there is mixed ability teaching) and non-vocational, even
though work experience is now a compulsory part of the school
curriculum. Although the dropout rate is somewhere between 5
and 10%, over 90% of 16 year old school leavers apply to go on
to upper secondary schooling, with 79% immediately accepted1 35
This "upper secondary" schooling level is made up of two,
three and four year theoretical courses, two year vocational
programs ('lines') and some 400 special vocational courses.
Around 70% of the age cohort complete the program of upper
secondary education. In these integrated 'upper secondary'
schools, between 16 and 25 areas of study, offering a mixture
134 G.Rehn 'Sweden' pp 1-171 in G.Rehn and K.Helveg Peterson
Education and Youth Employment in Sweden and Denmark (Berkeley:
Carnegie Council of Policy Studies in Higher Education, 1980)
p60
135 These and other figures come from A.Bjorklund and
I.Persson-Tanimura ' Youth Employment in Sweden' pp 232-268 in
Reubens Youth at Work op cit pp 233ff
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of technical and theoretical work, dominate the curriculuml 36.
Vocational guidance and job placement is the joint
responsibility of schools and local (tripartite) labor market
boards. Since 1977 local Youth Planning Councils have been
set up in all municipalities, and are designed to help schools
keep in contact with school leavers for two years after they
leave, offering help and advice where needed 7. Overseeing
the whole process is the all important public employment
service, which spreads good practice and helps coordinate
local activities.
Although the Labor Market Board expects youth under the age of
twenty to get training and education in the school system,
employment training is one of the most important parts of
Swedish labor market policy1 38. It is geared at both those in
work (to keep them employed in the long term) and at the
unemployed, a significant proportion of whom are young people.
Labor market training (or AMU, short for
Arbetsmarknadsutbildning, which is also translated as
136 The Economist reports the figure of ,6 major lines of
study, Ginsburg says that each school probably specializes in
twenty lines, and Rehn says over 90% of students enroll in one
of 23 major lines. See Swedish Schools' op cit p16; H.Ginsburg
'How Sweden combats unemployment among young and older workers'
pp 22-27 in Monthly Labor Review Vol 105 No 10 (October 1982);
Rehn 'Sweden' op cit p132
137 See Ginsburg Full Employment and Public Policy op cit
p 189 or Ginsburg 'How Sweden' op cit p23
138 See Swedish Labour Market Policy op cit p25
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"training for labor market reasons") is aimed at the post-
school population, and is usually centered around relatively
short courses (the average length is five months) and is based
in secondary schools, enterprises or local authorities. In
the second quarter of 1978, Rehn reports that of the 19,000
young Swedes terminating an AMU course, 81% completed it, 7%
left for a job and the final 12% left for other reasons. Six
months later, of those who completed the course, 65% were in
employment, 8% in relief or sheltered work, and 10% were
unemployed1 9.
Until the Swedish economic downturn of 1971, strong
macroeconomic performance absorbed the vast majority of young
people into work, and therefore into the extensive system of
retraining (funded in large part by the government) for those
in work. Outside the education sphere (where attempts were
made to broaden access), the Swedish government responded to
economic depression with various measures to promote the
hiring of young workers, both through subsidies to employers
and by boosting the capacity of labor market boards by
assigning staff specifically to deal with the needs of young
people . Although unemployed Swedes are guaranteed at least
part time work in the public sector after one year's
139 Rehn 'Sweden' op cit p93
140 Rehn 'Sweden' ibid p82
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unemployment, legislation in 1984 led to the setting up of so-
called "youth teams" under the guidance of local authorities
specifically to offer part time employment to unemployed
people under the age of 19. Some 40,000 young people were
helped in this way in 1984141. It is ironic that because of
perceived social cost the Swedish government should have
resorted to precisely the sort of public sector job creation
that does so little to equip people with necessary skills in
the United States.
Central to the overall macroeconomic strategy in Sweden is the
full integration of public employment policy with the
requirements of the private sector. Specifically Osterman
highlights the interaction of public employment policy with
strong internal labor markets in the private sector, both of
which rely on detailed regulation of the work relation through
legally enforced worker representation. The strength of
corporatist style bargaining is vital to the Swedish and West
German systems, but is hindered in Britain (and virtually non-
existent) in the United States because of the historic
weakness of workers' and employers' representative
organizations, and in the present conjuncture by the antipathy
of governments in both countries to trade union in matters
141 'Sweden: Labour Market Policy and Unemployment' pp 24-
26 in European Industrial Relations Review No 133 (February
1985) p26
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considered to be the prerogative of management.
The Swedish system is far less rigid and divisive than the
German, but nonetheless extremely carefully planned and
monitored, with selective policies introduced to cater for
sections of the population needing special help (for instance
immigrants or the occupationally handicapped14 2. What is most
noticeable is that commitment to extended basic education can
provide the foundations for a virtuous circle of high
productivity, innovation and continuing education throughout
life.
142 Rehn reports that immigrants, who made up a miniscule
part of the population in 1950 now constitute 8% of it. See
Rehn 'Sweden' op cit
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C. All Embracing eo-Liberalism
2.3 BRITAIN 1982-89
In this section I will contend that policies for the education
and training of young people introduced by successive
administrations under Mrs Thatcher since 1981 represent a
fundamental break with past practice. This is not simply a
quantative matter of the number of young unemployed people
involved in the Youth Training Scheme (YTS), or the amounts of
government finance injected into the programs, important
though these indicators are1 43 . Rather, I want to argue that
it is the shaRe of the policies pursued by Mrs Thatcher and
her Ministers -in terms of overall strategy and content - that
mark them out as truly new departures in training policy, and
not simply "radical reformulations" of longstanding
voluntarist practice . These innovations were not the
inevitable product of neoconservative governance of a
faltering economy in the midst of economic recession - the
143 Two historians of industrial training in Britain
emphasize that the 'New Training Initiative' of 1981 was a
departure from previous policy because of its emphasis on the
content of training (p51), and argue that the YTS represents an
"unparalleled extension of state involvement in training, in
terms of both form and content and most notably in respect of
finance". See Sheldrake and Vickerstaff History of Industrial
Training op cit p52. I seek to build on this argument.
144 This (evolutionary) analysis is advanced in D.Lee 'The
Transformation of Training and the Transformation of Work in
Britain' pp 156-170 in S.Wood (ed) The Transformation of Work?
(London: Unwin Hyman, 1989)
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American (counter)example is useful testimony to that.
Instead, we need to probe deeper into the peculiarities of
British politics in the 1980s to understand the roots, and
more importantly the significance, of Mrs Thatcher's "training
revolution". We will then be in a position to use our
historical and comparative perspective to explain the results
of British experience, and draw lessons from it.
It would be quite wrong to believe that Mrs Thatcher arrived
in office in 1979 armed with a blueprint for labor market
activism. In fact, despite the feverish activity of
conservative educationalists and industrialists in the 'Great
Debate' on education (and perhaps because of divisions within
party ranks145) the Conservative Manifesto of 1979 made little
mention of training provision, trusting instead monetarist
economics to revive all parts of the economy. Furthermore,
Mrs Thatcher's free market instincts led her away from
interference in the labor market. Citing The Sunday Times of
London, David Robertson reports that Mrs Thatcher's disdain
for expanded government led her to look to abolish the MSC and
145 Gleeson identifies a longstanding division in government
thinking on vocational training related to education: on the one
hand, those who believe in enterprise (now led by Lord Young)
and on the other those who believe in standards (centered around
the 'Hillgate' group). See D.Gleeson The Paradox of Traininq
(Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1989) p10
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the system of Industrial Training Boards14 6. In the same vein,
in Mrs Thatcher's first two years in office, the occupational
guidance service of Job Centre Careers Advisors was cut, the
MSC Skillcentre chain reduced in size, and the MSC's
management and professional recruitment service was turned
into an independent commercial agencyl4 7.
The government saw tight monetary policy and reductions in
trade union power as central to the "primary emphasis" of its
labor market policy, namely the lowering of wage levels and
the squeezing of inflationary expectations - identified in
monetarist analysis as the cause of poor economic
performance - out of the economy 48 . Policies for youth
employment were part of this coordinated strategy: for
example, as part of its emphasis on reducing the 'rigidities'
at the bottom end of the labor market, the Chancellor
announced in his 1981 budget the introduction of the "Young
Workers' Scheme", which offered wage subsidies to employers
taking on young employees at particularly low wages (less than
146 Robertson 'Mrs Thatcher's Employment Prescription' op
cit p282
147 See Jackson 'A Seat at the Table?' op cit p34
148 See K.Mayhew 'Reforming the Labor Market' pp 60-79 in
Oxford Review of Economic Policy Vol 1, No 2 (Summer 1985)
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fifty pounds per week in the first year of employment)14 9. The
cost of the singleminded pursuit of these goals - most
obviously the doubling of unemployment between 1979 and 1981 -
hit young people particularly hard: in the year from January
1980, unemployment among youth under 18 years of age rose from
11% to 19%150. The pressure for a pragmatic response to the
unemployment problem can be gauged from a paper prepared by
Sir John Hoskyns of the Downing Street Policy Unit in February
1981, which said:
We all know that there is no prospect. of getting
unemployment down to acceptable levels in the next few
years. (Consequently), we must show that we have some
political imagination, that we are willing to salvage
something 1 albeit second best, from the sheer waste
involved 51
Furthermore, The Times reported in May 1983 that a
confidential Central Policy Review Staff (CPRS)152 document
stated that the "essence" of YTS "is to reduce the size of the
labour force"1 53. Here are signs labor market problems
149 The scheme covered 130,000 young people at its peak in
1982. See Marsden, Trinder and Wagner 'Measures to Reduce Youth
Unemployment' op cit p44
150 Cited in M.Moos 'The Training Myth' pp 254-276 in
D.Gleeson (ed) Youth Training and the Search for Work (London:
Routledge, Keegan and Paul, 1983) p270 (footnote 14)
151 Quoted in P.Riddell The Thatcher Government 2nd Edn
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1985) p50
152 The CPRS was a Downing Street 'think tank' set up by
Harold Wilson in the mid 1970s, and eventually disbanded by Mrs
Thatcher
153 The Times May 19 1983 cited in Robertson 'Mrs Thatcher's
Employment Prescription' op cit p290
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providing a clear impetus for reforms, quite in the 'reactive'
tradition of previous policy initiatives. By the Spring of
1981, after Norman Tebbit's installation as Employment
Minister 154 , the MSC published A New Training Initiative: A
Consultative Document which followed its review of the 1973
Act and set three major objectives to guide training policy in
the 1980s 155. They were, first, the development of skills
training to agreed standards for available jobs; second, the
commitment that every school leaver under the age of 18 should
have the opportunity to pursue full time education or planned
job training or work experience; and finally the pledge to
improve opportunities for retraining by adults. In fact, the
retraining of adult workers has progressed slowly1 56, but
policy developments formally directed towards the first two
154 The Report of the National Labour Movement Inquiry into
Youth Unemployment and Training identifies Mr Tebbit's
appointment as the start of strategic policy formulation in the
training field by the government. See Section II: Targets in
the Firing Line of Government Policy or Youth Unemployment and
Training (Birmingham: TURC Publishing, 1987) p2
155 A New Training Initiative: A Consultative Document
(Sheffield: MSC, 1981). Chapman and Tooze report that the
overwhelming majority of the 1000 written responses to the
consultative document supported these objectives. See Chapman
and Tooze The Youth Training Scheme op cit p50
156 The Youth Task Group, set up by the government to work
out the details of the New Training Initiative, had originally
suggested that one third of all training places be set aside for
those already in work, but this was cut to 5% when the final
plans were put into operation by the government. See D.Finn
'YTS: The Jewel in the MSC's Crown?' pp 52-75 in C.Benn and
J.Fairley (eds) Challenging the MSC: On Jobs, Training and
Education (London: Pluto, 1986) p63
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objectives have proceeded apace. In order to gain a full
understanding of what these policies are intended to do, I
think it is useful to examine both the new structures of
policy organization, and the innovations in policy content.
The strategic innovations since 1981 have been three-fold, and
can be succinctly explained. First, an increasingly effective
commitment to the universal provision of some form of
training/work experience placement for all unemployed school
leavers under the age of 18. Second, increasingly formal links
between training requirements and the educational system, at
both pre-vocational and vocational levels. Third, clear
attempts to use the training system (and its links with the
welfare system) in tandem with other policy initiatives to
affect the situation in the broader labor market. In other
words, the government has tried to overcome some of the
deepseated flaws of previous policies, most obviously by
grounding its plans for training in the broader economic and
political context. Clearly, given my analysis of previous
failings of British policy making in this field, this
recognition of the need to integrate training provision with
the rest of government policy is to be welcomed: one could say
that Mrs Thatcher learnt an important lesson from the German
approach. However, despite this potential for progress, we
will see that the standards and range of British vocational
education and training remain woefully inadequate. This
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failure radically to improve Britain's training record is a
product of the content of training policy in the 1980s - most
importantly the belief that the market can and should frame
the operation of public policies. It is to this apparent
paradox - between the promise of the new strategy and failings
of the new content - that we now turn.
Universal Provision: YTS
YTS, which Soskice and Finegold remind us was "the first
permanent training programme for school leavers" in Britain
and the "centrepiece" of the New Training Initiative (NTI)157,
explicitly drew on West German and French experience, and
replaced YOPS with the promise of one year's broad work-based
training, including at least 13 weeks training off the job.
Day to day management of the scheme was devolved to 4200
training agencies operating in over 100,000 workplaces. The
majority of places were provided by private sector employers
(Mode 'A' of the scheme, run through employers, accounted for
300,000 places in the initial plans), the rest being offered
by public bodies or voluntary groups (Mode 'B' of the scheme,
with 160,000 places in the initial plan) 5 8. Trainees were
paid an allowance (from public funds) of 29.50 pounds per
week, with quality control of the training or work experience
157 Finegold and Soskice 'The Future of Training in Britain'
op cit p31
158 Figures from Finn 'YTS: The Jewel' op cit p54
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the responsibility of local (tripartite) Area Manpower Boards
(AMBs).
In its first few years, however, the one year program proved
to be a disappointing failure. Apart from the slow start in
the first year (when only three quarters of the places were
filled, fully one fifth of the participants dropped out, and
one third of those completing the training became
unemployed159), 1985 surveys of Managing Agents (MAs) showed
that only one third of trainees were getting systematic on the
job training (OJT), with 40% of trainees helping adult workers
with their normal tasks, and one third doing the work of other
160
regular employees . Furthermore, a survey of further
education courses provided outside the workplace in 1983/4
found that outside a minimum number of apprentice-type
courses, there "was little evidence of integration or
coordination of core skills, vocational studies, and work
experience...and no clear evidence of required standards of
performance being understood or achieved"1 61.
159 Figures from Finn 'YTS: The Jewel' op cit p64
160 Cited in D.Finn 'Why Train School-leavers?' pp 1-8 in
Unemployment Bulletin (London: Unemployment Unit) Issue 28
(Autumn 1988) p4
161 YTS in Further Education 1983/4: An HMI (Her Majesty's
Inspectorate) Survey (London: DES, 1985) quoted in Finn YTS:
The Jewel' op cit p61
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This spluttering start to what The Guardian called "the most
far reaching proposals for industrial training ever put before
Parliament" 162 was no doubt in part due to the time and
budgetary constraints on the implementation of a complex
program - by the next year 356,000 young people were involved
in the program163. The government did recognize, however, that
some superstructural changes were necessary, and modified the
scheme in various ways, most notably by extending it to cover
a two year duration (with an allowance of 35 pounds per week
for the second year), and by abolishing the formal distinction
(and important differences in funding) between Mode A and Mode
B schemes. The extension of the program to two years for 16
year old entrants brought the scheme urther in line with the
thinking behind the West German dual system, while the
levelling down of funding arrangements to that operating on
employer led schemes hampered the attempts of local
authorities and voluntary groups to cater for the (more
expensive) requirements of people with special needs164.
162 16 December 1981 cited in Gleeson Paradox of Training
op cit p45
163 Marsden, Trinder and Wagner 'Measures to Reduce
Unemployment' op cit p 44
164 The Report of the National Labour Movement Enquiry into
Youth Unemployment and Training explains the changes in funding
structure as part of the MSC's withdrawal from "uncommercial"
projects, and say that the shortfall in funds for what were
previously Mode B schemes (now called Premium Place Schemes) has
rendered projects in many areas inviable. See Targets in the
Firing Line op cit p23
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It seems, however, that ideology overrode a key lesson
emerging from the policy legacies handed on to the government,
one that would have required more deepseated changes in the
basis of the scheme's operation. By the late 1970s, it was
becoming increasingly clear to policy elites that tinkering
with the system would not spur training provision. In the
joint DE/MSC consultative document Training for Vital Skills,
published in 1976, radical proposals were put forward for the
collective funding of the initial stages of training in
transferable skills, as a means to ensure a stable supply of
skilled workers in key sectors165. Furthermore, the MSC's
review of the 1973 Act concluded that "both theory and
experience suggest that left to themselves individual firms
will not undertake enough training fully to meet the needs of
the economy for transferable skills" 1 66. Nonetheless, in the
earliest stages of the development of YTS the government made
clear that it was determined to move the balance of
responsibility for training back towards individual employers
and trainees, restoring precisely the weaknesses that
successive pieces of legislation had sought (admittedly in a
very mild way) to attenuate.
165 See S.Vickerstaff 'Industrial Training in Britain: The
Dilemmas of a neocorporatist policy' pp 45-64 in A.Cawson (ed)
Organised Interests and the State (London: Sage, 1985) p58
166 Outlook on Training (Sheffield: MSC, 1980) quoted in
D.Lee 'Social Policy and Institutional Autonomy in Further
Education' pp 234-253 in Gleeson (ed) Youth Training and the
Search for Work op cit p240
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In a Cabinet increasingly infused with Mrs Thatcher's free
market radicalism, policy sought to break down public controls
on training and raise private sector control of ostensibly
public programs. In November 1981, Mrs Thatcher's government
dismantled 15 of the 23 Industry Training Boards, originally
designed to facilitate the effective coordination and
promotion of education and training within individual
industries. Given that these industry specific Boards proved
to have too narrow an outlook for the effective teaching of
transferable skills to trainees, this decision could only
serve further to fragment the training offered - in this case
to the level of the individual firm. Furthermore, various key
decisions in the early operation of YTS added to this
fragmentation. Three examples will suffice16 7: first, it was
agreed that irrespective of fulfillment of other conditions
(for instance relating to the quality of training), existing
programs could be continued by employers with YTS funds if
they offered at least three months off the job training;
secondly, in the face of employer opposition, the stipulation
that YTS training should be linked to broad occupational
requirements was abandoned, and skill specific training deemed
acceptable; thirdly, and probably most importantly, Lee
explains that the original Youth Task Group recommendations
167 The first two are taken from Chapman and Tooze The Youth
Training Scheme op cit p56, the third from Lee 'The
Transformation of Training' op cit p166ff (quotation p .68)
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for YTS 'black-boxed' the content of on the job training as
the price of gaining employer agreement to provide work
placements - in other words, employers were given "decisive
control over the content of workplace training"168. For the
government, these decisions were quite consistent with its
view of the role for public policy in the labor market. As
its 1985 White Paper put it:
The key contribution of government in a free society is
to do all it can to create a climate in which enterprise
can flourish, above all by removing obstacle 6to the
working of markets, especially labor markets69
It is also noteworthy that the government has presided over
the increasing 'privatization' of the structure of training
provision itself, via the establishment of Private Training
Agencies which take public funds to run private schemes. In
one survey of 450 YTS Managing Agents, one in eight sid they
looked to make a profit from youth training 70.
168 Keep locates the source of this 'black-boxing' of
training content in the determination of the Confederation of
British Industry (an important actor in YTG deliberations) to
achieve employer leadership of training programs. See E.Keep
'Designing the Stable Door: A Study of how the Youth Training
Scheme was Planned' (Warwick Papers in Industrial Relations No
8, May 1986) p26
169 Employment: The Challenge for the Nation (London: HMSO,
1985) pl
170 Report of National Labour Movement Inquiry into Youth
Training and Unemployment Section II: Targets in the Firing Line
op cit p63. The report also claims that 30% of employer-based
scheme places in major urban areas are organised by Private
Training Agencies
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Although the first cohort of 16 year olds emerging from the
two year YTS have only been in the labor market for about a
year now, it is not premature to use various pieces of
evidence to gain an insight into the operation of the revamped
scheme, and to use emerging understanding of the early
operation of the scheme to make an informed analysis of its
likely course of development. The distinguishing features of
YTS in comparison to previous schemes should be that through
its planned and integrated structure it does more than remove
people from the unemployment rolls, offering instead improved
direction and content of education and training, to the
benefit of both the economy at large and the young people
concerned. However, on both these counts, it seems that the
government's continued reliance on the free operation of
market forces is hampering efforts to overcome the early
teething troubles of one year YTS.
Evidence from May 1987 shows that in half the cases surveyed,
YTS providers failed to meet quality standards set down by the
MSC171. Furthermore, the declining size of the 16 and 17 year
old population and the increasing demand for labor prompted by
economic growth have provoked worries within the MSC that
young workers will be lured straight into jobs without
sufficient training. An MSC review of funding arrangements
171 Cited in Finegold and Soskice 'The Failure of Training'
op cit p35
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summed up the problem as follows:
A more competitive labour market will pose a major
challenge to YTS, given that some employers may still
take a short term view and neglect training, while young
peony themselves may opt for the immediate prospect of
pay
Worries about the commitment of employers to provide training
of long term use are given added potency by the warped
occupational structure of YTS. In a recent letter to the
Financial Times, Ronald Leighton MP, Chairman of the House of
Commons Select Committee on Employment, complained that YTS
was not remedying Britain's 'skills gap'. "50% of
participants are in trades like retailing, where there are no
shortages" he wrote, and continued, "YTS does not achieve the
qualifications for the new technology jobs"1 73 . Historically,
YTS has been unable to direct its trainees to high skill
training. A major new study of the early operation of YTS
concludes that:
The YTS has failed to provide school leavers with
relevant qualifications, and rather than increasing the
number of young people in 'new technology' jobs, has
tended merely to intensify trends by increasing the
proportion industries where they were already
established
172 Quoted in Jackson 'More Leavers Shun Youth Training
Scheme' op cit p13
173 Financial Times 28 March 1989
174 Jobs for Young People - A Picture of Diminishing
Opportunity ESRC Information Bulletin (15/88) p2 16 November
1988 promoting the publication of the results of the study in
D.N.Ashton, M.J.Maguire and M.Spilsbury Re-structuring the
Labour Market: The Implications for Youth (London: MacMillan,
forthcoming)
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These traditional labor intensive industries like textiles
that used a high proportion of young workers are declining in
Britain, and cannot be expected to provide similar job
opportunities in the future. This is a point emphasized by
Gleeson, who has written:
While the evidence indicates that YTS leads some young
people into full time education, the majority of YTS
trainees are being trained either for skills which are
not in short supply, of7 hich bear little relation to the
eventual jobs obtained
Although the evidence of current skill shortages in the
British economy is inconsistentl 76, it seems clear that
continued failure adequately to train young workers in
developing industries will constrain the ability of British
companies to compete in those fields in the future. The
crucial question that emerges from this analysis is therefore
whether the failures of quality control and warped
occupational distribution of YTS simply reflect the
implementation difficulties of an ambitious program, or
whether instead more structural tendencies towards market
failure in the training field will constrain the effectiveness
of the scheme in the future, however smoothly its
implementation proceeds. This question is considered in
Chapter 3. For the moment, it is important to look at how the
175 Gleeson Paradox of Training op cit p25
176 For two opposing recent views see R.Atkins 'Skill
shortages 'less serious' than 1970s' Financial Times 28 March
1989 and F.Thompson 'UK companies face shortage of skills'
Financial Times 10 April 1989
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government has sought to link training to education and
economic policy.
Trainina. Education and Further Education
Earlier in the thesis, we saw how British (elite) education
has traditionally been separated from the world of work in
general, and training in particular. In the 1980s, links have
been made between education and vocational training, but only,
it seems, for that part of.the school population considered
'non-academic'. It is the purpose of this section to probe
developments in the relationship of training to education by
looking at, first, attempts to insert a greater vocational
element in British schools, and secondly in efforts to reorder
the priorities and role of further education (FE) in Britain.
The section will conclude with a discussion of the extent to
which the training and education systems remain bifurcated in
Britain.
We saw that a major element in the Great Debate on education
in the 1970s was the call to make education more 'useful' to
industry. This theme (often called 'vocational realism') has
taken shape in the 1980s. in reforms emphasizing a new teaching
ethos that stresses the extrinsic over the intrinsic value of
education, expressed in teaching aimed at skill/knowledge
targets, an emphasis on the instrumental value of education,
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and a rliance on the self-motivation of students1 77. The
government has implemented a wide range of interrelated
initiatives in this area (TVEI,CPVE,B/TEC to name three) but
there is, in theory at least, a common set of principles on
which they are based. They are enumerated by Gleeson: first,
an emphasis on cross-curricular and inter-disciplinary
enquiry; second, broadened teaching methods; third, stress on
group and professional work directed at problem solving and
enterprise skills; and finally, the target of a setting up
clear ladders of progression between school, college and
work178.
The Technical and Vocational Education Initiative (TVEI)
represents the most far-reaching curricular innovation since
the introduction of comprehensive schools 20 years ago, and
significantly, it has been introduced through an arm of the
Department of Employment, not through the Department of
Education and Science. TVEI has taken up issues raised by the
1963 Newsom Report, which was concerned with the position of
pupils aged 13-16 of average or less than average ability, and
what was seen as their failure sufficiently to prepare
177 R.Dale 'Examining the Gift-Horse's Teeth: A Tentative
Analysis of TVEI' pp 29-45 in S.Walker and L.Barton Youth,
Unemployent and Schooling (Milton Keynes: Open University
Press, 1986) pp 37/8
178 Gleeson Paradox of Trainina op cit p59
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themselves for working life1 79. As Chairman of the MSC, David
(now Lord) Young expressly linked TVEI to this theme:
The curriculum in English schools is too academic and
leads towards the universities. What I am trying to show
is that there is another line of development that is
equally respectable and desirable which leads to
vocational qualifications
Originally launched in 1983 as a pilot project in 14 Local
Education Authorities (LEAs) to equip 14-18 year olds with
broad-based skills in preparation for the world of work181,
TVEI was expanded to a national level in 1986, and by 1987/8
involved 650 schools and colleges and 80,000 students. Its
importance to the government can be gauged from their
substantial commitment of funds to it: 250 million pounds for
the pilot project and 900 million for the extension,
equivalent on a per capita basis to four times the allocation
179 See S.J.Blackman 'The Labour Market in School: New
Vocationalism and Issues of Socially Ascribed Discrimination' pp
27-56 in P.Brown and D.N.Ashton (eds) Education. Unemploment
and Labor Markets (London: Falmer Press, 1987) pp 28ff
180 Quoted in Finegold and Soskice 'The Politics of Training
in Britain' op cit p32
181 The link between TVEI and the objectives of YTS can be
judged by comparing Young's avowed aim for TVEI ("widen and
enrich the curriculum in a way that will help young people
prepare for the world of work" quoted in R.Dale 'The Background
and Inception of the TVEI' pp 41-56 in Dale (ed) Education,
Training and Employment op cit p41) with Education Minister
Peter Morrison's description of the educational objectives of
YTS. In 1983, the latter said of YTS: "The scheme is not a
social service. Its purpose is to teach youngsters what the
real world of work is all about." Quoted in C.Chitty 'TVEI: The
MSC's Trojan Horse' pp 76-98 in C.Benn and J.Fairley (eds)
Challenging the MSC: On Jobs, Training and Education (London:
Pluto, 1986) p85
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to other pupils in schoolsl82.
At one level, TVEI is more than a vocational component tacked
on to the regular courses: it has been introduced to
complement all aspects of the mainstream curriculum. However,
despite a formal commitment to involve pupils across the
ability range, de facto separation of less able pupils is
taking place at an early age (14). As Blackman says:
...both the able and less able pupils receive a new
integrated curriculum but thin either an implicitly or
explicitly streamed system
From this perspective, it seems that TVEI does indeed
represent part of an attempt to "control and restructure
education in order to facilitate and regulate a period of
rapid economic change"184 - at least for that part of the
population leaving school to try and find work. In practice,
however, it is important to realize that the specifics of
vocational education are ambiguous. Dale divines three
purposes of it (help pupils get jobs, make them better
performers in jobs, make then more aware of the world of work)
but recognizes that these concepts are "full of ambiguity", at
182 Figures from Gleeson Paradox of Training op cit p79 and
Blackman 'The Labor Market in Schools' op cit p40
183 Blackman Ibid p39
184 S.Ranson quoted in Chitty 'TVEI' op cit p94. See
S.Ranson 'Towards a Tertiary Tripartism: New Codes of Social
Control' in P.Broadfoot (ed) Selection. Certification and
Control: Social Issues in Educational Assessment (London: Falmer
Press, 1984)
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best setting parameters for local service delivery 85 . This
ambiguity at the core of TVEI is also reflected in conflicting
notions of its relationship to mainstream education. On the
one hand, TVEI Project Director Christopher Lea has said that
TVEI aims to "moderate the harsh distinction between education
and training", while his boss David Young insists that
"training should not be confused with education...training is
about work-related skills and is intricately connected with
employment"1 86 .
The government has also sought to reorient educational
provision beyond schools. The Further Education sector in
Britain has traditionally catered for people in employment,
and not been scrutinised for its contribution to helping the
unemployed find work. In the 1970s, the FE sector saw a five
fold increase in the number of students taking its business
courses, but it is only since 1979 that greater central
direction has been imposed on what were previously
voluntaristic local arrangements18 7. The government has
committed over 3.5 billion pounds of centrally administered
185 Dale 'Examining the Gift-Horse's Teeth' op cit pp 33ff
186 Quoted in Chitty 'TVEI' op cit p81
187 Gleeson has presented this as a "crossroads" for FE,
"between its traditional localized relation with the labor
market and the newer, more centralized, requirements of national
training policy (NTI) which have come to impinge upon it".
Gleeson The Paradox of Training op cit p6/7
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funds for Non-Advanced Further Education (NAFE) and training
in 1988/9, transferring money to the MSC to buy FE services.
The Times Educational SupDlement has summed up the
government's new activism as follows:
Whichever way you look at it, this is a giant's stride
towards the nationalisation of FE. This goes further
than anything else to brand t LEAs as mere agents of a
quango responsible to the DE
As in its attempts to reorganize the school curriculum, the
government has tried to turn the FE curriculum towards
integrated work-based qualifications, perhaps recognising the
hazards of a system lacking central coordination and
standards1 89 . The major organizational innovation here is the
work of the National Council for Vocational Qualifications
(NCVQ), which by 1991 will have standardized the variety of
examinations on offer. There seems good reason to question,
however, the type of training envisaged by the government and
MSC in their curriculum designs. A lot of attention has been
focussed on the MSC's emphasis on 'social and life skills'
which have come to symbolize the shift away from social
educationl90. The roots of this 'deficit' model of trainees
188 TES 3rd February 1984 quoted in B.Walker 'Behind Closed
Doors: FE, Centralisation and the YTS' pp 91-99 in Policy and
Politics Vol 15 No 2 (1987) p95
189 See for example the differences between the British and
German systems in Prais and Wagner 'Some Practical Aspects of
Human Capital Investment' op cit
190 See R.Moore 'Schooling and the World of Work' pp 64-103
in Bates et al (eds) Schooling for the Dole? op cit p 66ff
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seem to lie in the claim of the 1977 Holland Committee that
employers turn young people down for jobs for reasons of
attitude/ personality and appearance/manners 91 . The skills
under scrutiny are ostensibly designed to prepare young people
for the challenges of working life - challenges for which
school has not yet prepared them - centered around four
organizing themes: money, people, communication, and logical
and numerate approaches to business problems. However,
sections of the SLS curriculum on "talking to strangers",
"being polite and helpful", and "planning money" seem far
removed from training in transferable skills necessary for
work in the industries of the twenty-first century.
Together with the TVEI, the FE courses form an important part
of Lord Young's tripartite vision of the school leaving
population. Young expressed his vision as "a world in which
15% of our younger people go into higher education...another
30-35% will stay on doing TVEI, along with other courses...the
remainder, about half, will go on to two year YTS"192. Within
FE, however, Gleeson sees further fragmentation, between three
groups at whom further education is targeted: the traditional
but declining craft apprentice intake (now including typing,
child care etc); the academic/technical intake of the late
191 See Walker 'Behind Closed Doors' op cit p97
192 Quoted in Finn 'Why Train School Leavers?' op cit p2
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1960s and 1970s, including business, management, and social
work; and finally the "tertiary modern intake" of unemployed
and unemployable young people offered generic skill training.
A major problem that is beginning to emerge, however, is that
while the government's aim for structural reformulation of the
education/industry relationship can be easily stated, the
content of various programs have not been rigorously
demarcated. This is not only significant for the obvious
confusion it causes, but will be inefficient as the number of
young people declines for demographic reasons, and different
schemes (as well as employers) compete for recruits. Keep
suggests that this is the product of precisely the sort of ad
hoc, reactive policy-making that plagued previous
governments 193 . This seems to ignore the fact that the present
government does have clearly stated ideas about the direction
of youth VET policy, even if political expediency and
bureaucratic rivalries lead to competition between programs.
What does all this mean for the long term relationship between
education and training? There seems to be little consensus on
this issue. On the one hand, the traditional division between
theory and practice and creative and imitative development
193 E.Keep 'Britain's Attempts to Create a National
Vocational and Educational System: A Review of Progress'
(Warwick Papers in Industrial Relations No 16, September 1987)
pp 15ff
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continues to divide what is perceived to be education and what
training. At the same time, however, educational expenditure
is increasingly slanted towards the provision of vocational
training, and justified as such. Given our previous
understanding of the vagaries of the strict demarcation
between education and training, this looks like an advance.
The problem is that public policy as currently formulated
enforces divisions between young people at very early ages
(debatably, as early as 11 with the new requirements for
testing that were included in the 1988 Education Reform Act).
One is therefore forced to enquire why this 'pigeonholing'
should be thought necessary so early. The fact that it occurs
with efficient precision at 14 in the German system may be
part of an explanation, though not an excusel94.
Compulsor Training and the Low Wage Economy
Since the 1979 election, Conservative governments under Mrs
Thatcher have been unstinting in their insistence that it is
high real wages that cause unemployment, through their ill
effects on price competitiveness. Chancellor of the Exchequer
194 It is noteworthy in this regard that the divisiveness
of the German system is a subject of criticism in West Germany.
Reporting on a major Anglo-German conference, Jackson reports
that "the German team at the conference, certainly the
educationists (sic) present, spoke of an uphill struggle against
the divisiveness of their system, which they said provided
excellent vocational education for the majority, but cuts them
off from the academic few and labels them from the start as
second best." See Jackson 'Germans raise doubts' op cit
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Nigel Lawson went as far as to say that the low wage Hong Kong
economy was a model for British economic revival19 5. As we saw
earlier, the Young Workers' Scheme was used to encourage the
growth of low wage jobs for youth. However, the government's
strategy for youth wages was two-pronged - Lawson explained it
as follows:
I want to do more to improve the job prospects for young
people and the unskilled...I have concluded that an
effective response to this problem must include direct
action in two related areas - to cut down the cost of
employing the young and unskilled, and to sharpen their
own inc tive to work at wages which employers can afford
to pay
This "sharpening of incentives" has taken the form of the
increasingly stringent application of rules on social security
entitlement that have progressively whittled down the reasons
deemed to be "good cause" for refusal of a place on a training
scheme, culminating in the provisions in the 1988 Social
Security Act which excluded all under 18s (apart from those in
exceptional circumstances, like pregnant women) from benefit
entitlement, on the premise that a training place (assumed
suitable) was available to all young people under 18.
Notwithstanding the problems we have already discussed
concerning the opportunities afforded young people under YTS,
it is important to see that young people without financial
195 The Sunday Times 5th August 1984 p5. Cited in Robertson
'Mrs Thatcher's Employment Prescription' op cit p282
196 Employment News March 1985 p2. Cited in Robertson Ibid
p282
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means are forced to take up the training place offered to them
or to take up any job they can find. The cumulative effect of
these linked policies is to limit the horizons of young people
even as they leave school, and prepare them for jobs in the
secondary labor market.
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Chapter 3
COMPLETING THE LEARNING CURVE: THE POLITICS OF YOUTH POLICY
The structure of this thesis is intended to promote a step by
step understanding of the dimensions of policy for youth VET.
In Chapter 1 we proceeded from an analysis of the theoretical
underpinnings of policy for youth training to posit a working
typology of the different policy options on offer. In the
case studies in Chapter 2, we examined the policies pursued in
various countries in the post war period. The aim was not
primarily to explain the roots of specific policies, but
rather to explicate their impact on the transition from school
to work, and thereby point to lessons for future policy
development. The purpose of this chapter is to draw out the
key implications of the case studies with an eye to Britain's
policy needs in the 1990s.
3.1 INTEGRATED POLICY INITIATIVES
In our theoretical model, we suggested that policy for the
transition from school to work had to be seen as one part of
overall labor market strategy, which itself formed a subset of
broader economic and social policy. Put another way, under a
government possessed of a coherent set of economic and social
objectives, policy for youth VET should form part of an
internally consistent package. We suggested that when
marginalized from the rest of policy-making, policies for the
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transition from school to work would not properly contribute
to long term economic well-being. The comparison of American
and early British policy with German and Swedish experience
seems to bear out this proposition, and Mrs Thatcher seems to
have put the lesson into practice. Despite the haste with
which policies have been implemented (and sometimes thought
out), taken together they do form part of a coherent strategy.
At the same time, however, British experience in the 1980s has
demonstrated that the development of policy for youth VET is
not simply a technical matter requiring foresight and the
coordination of the work of different government departments:
a policy for youth VET successfully integrated into a broader
strategy can be used to pursue various ends. We therefore
need to ask "integrated into what?". Swedish and West German
policies for youth VET are designed to contribute to the
development of a high skill, high wage economy, while Mrs
Thatcher's strategy has been to emulate the success of
'process innovators' like Taiwan and Hong Kong197. The
economic costs of this policy are not our main concern here:
suffice to note that while the integration of policy for youth
197 The distinction here is between 'process innovation', where
a company seeks to produce other people's inventions more cheaply,
and 'product-innovation', where a company tries to gain market
share by developing its own products. It is ironic that South
Korea, originally seen as a process-innovator, now has 25% more
students in higher education than the UK. Cited in G.Brown Where
There is Greed...Margaret Thatcher and the Betrayal of Britain's
Future (Edinburgh: Mainstream, 1989) p49
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VET into broader economic strategy is a necessary condition
for successful policy development, it does not provide
sufficient information with which to judge the implications of
a program. It is obviously the interaction between policy
content and the prevailing economic and social situation that
determines the eventual course of a properly integrated
policy, and in this area we can learn a further lesson from
Mrs Thatcher's controlled experiment in 'active neo-
liberalism'.
3.2 THE ROLE OF THE MARKET
We saw in the last chapter that at a very practical level the
market basis of training provision in the Youth Training
Scheme was undermining the development of a suitably skilled
workforce in Britain. Between 1986 and 1988, more than 76% of
YTS trainees received no qualification and 15% received only
one198, and we have already seen the bias of the system away
from precisely the flexible, transferable skills needed for
the future. In Britain (to a greater extent than in West
Germany or Japan for reasons discussed later), government
needs to either induce or force employer participation in any
system of youth VET. The problem for a government adhering to
neoclassical economic principles is that compulsion of
business participation or expensive financial inducements are
198 Cited in Brown Where There is Greed Ibid p54
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politically or economically unacceptable. In the neoclassical
paradigm, individual employers must be left to decide whether
or not to participate in the program according to their own
cost-benefit analyses, which invariably only lead to
participation at the expense of long term skill development.
While the NCVQ system will undoubtedly improve the paper
figures on qualifications, we need to ask whether this will be
enough to counteract what Streeck calls "endemic and
inevitable" market failures in the provision of skills
trainingl99 .
At a most basic level, we know how the incentives facing
individual firms can collude to block the development of
suitable training provision. For profit-maximizing employers,
a necessary and sufficient condition for any investment
(including an investment in the human capital of young people
through the provision of training) is obviously that the net
return on the investment exceed its opportunity cost. In the
case of education and training, the situation is only
marginally complicated by the basic difference highlighted in
human capital theory between general and specific skills,
provision of the former being subject to recruitment raids by
free riding competitors, provision of the latter obviating the
extent of free ridership but offering limited benefits to a
199 Streeck 'Skills and the Limits of Neo-Liberalism' op cit
p14
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modern economy in an age of rapidly changing skill
requirements.
Experience in the post war period suggests that a training
policy resting on the free market decisions of individual
firms, whatever its context (passive or active state), will
suffer from a classic problem. Firms will shy away from
training provision for fear of losing the investment to free
riding competitors (witness the unsatisfactory level of
training provision in the overwhelmingly voluntarist climate
before 1964), but when circumstances (of financial inducement
or cultural pressure) change to provoke some training
provision, firms will skew provision to their own short term
advantage (shown in the unsatisfactory occupational structure
of current British provision). The iony of the situation is
that in today's highly competitive conditions, the failure to
invest resources in training for the (as yet unknown) skill
requirements of the 1990s and beyond is dysfunctional for
employers as a collectivity. This is what leads Streeck to
write:
If society wants skills, enterprises have to be drafted
and mandated by regulating agencies to produce
them...collective, or "corporatist", self-governance of
enterprises can safely function only if it is bacb6 by
some form of state support and legal facilitation
200 Streeck 'Skills and the Limits of Neo-Liberalism' Ibid pp
26/7
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The neo-liberal government is, however, trapped: free market
decisions fail to produce the necessary quality and quantity
of training, but ideology dictates that state intervention can
only make matters worse. The unremitting 'short-termism'
embedded in both British industrial structure and the
decision-making calculus of individual firms only exacerbates
the problem (see below).
The implications of this analysis introduce a striking paradox
into discussions of incentive-based public policies aiming to
make 'public use of private interest'2 01. Such policies
represent the most mild form of government intervention,
leaving property rights and power structures untouched.
However, the analysis of-this thesis suggests that while
interventionist governments can quite easily accommodate such
policies within their ideological outlook, the most basic
political and economic principles of the neoclassical school
will prevent the effective use of incentive-based interference
by governments of neo liberal stripe. The free market
philosophy rests on the assumption that the atomized profit
maximising decisions of individual actors in the marketplace
produce optimal results in both the economic and political
realm, maximising the production of wealth and checking the
abuse of political power.
201 See C.L.Schultze The Public Use of rivate Interest
(Washington: Brookings, 1977)
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Even when principle is bent for the sake of political gain,
for instance to spur employers to participate in initiatives
for youth training, free market economic thinking makes it
difficult to redirect private interest. While Keynesian
governments in the post war era aw government expenditure as
a useful tool in the management of the economy, monetarists
see it as the cause of economic malaise, and therefore balk at
extensive public outlays to induce particular behavior from
private actors.
In Britain, the failures of market-led training provision have
been clearly demonstrated, and the Labour Party has learnt
from the Thatcher experience. The need for the integration of
training policy into broader economic policy has been retained
from the Thatcher experiment, but its market basis has been
rejected by the Party (in its latest policy document202).
Nonetheless, while British policy in the 1980s has reaffirmed
generally applicable lessons that the West Germans learnt some
time ago, it has also pointed up peculiarities in the British
scene - peculiarities with specific policy relevance for the
1990s.
202 See Meet the Challenge. Make the Change (London: Labour
Party, 1989)
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3.3 THE SPECIFICITY OF THE NATIONAL CONTEXT
Our analysis of the failings of British policy in the 1980s
clearly directed primary blame at Mrs Thatcher's reliance on
the market to deliver suitable training. While German policy
involves the regulation and prompting of the market by the
state to produce desired results, we concluded that the
failures of the British system were in large part explicable
in terms of the latitude offered individual employers. At the
same time, however, it would be remiss to pretend that the
whole of the problem, and therefore its solution, are so
clearly rooted in one difference between British and German
policy, namely the level of government intervention.
Specifically, it is important to ask whether the decision-
making rationality of British employers might produce
different results from the free operation of market forces in
West Germany. In the case of training provision, the
decisions of individual British employers are circumscribed by
a national financial scene that seems to exacerbate general
tendencies visible in other countries. Keep notes the
following peculiarity of employers' attitudes towards training
in Britain:
.. there has been little sign that the broad mass of
British employers have yet appreciated that one of the
major factors underlying the success of the West German
or Japanese VET system is the more positive attitude of
employers n those countries towards investment in
training'
203 Keep 'Britain's Attempts' op cit p6
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I do not intend to address cultural differences (political and
other) here, not least because if they exist they are not
easily amenable to reform by public policy204 . I do think it
is important, however, to consider how the financial rationale
for business decisions is framed in different countries,
because 'market rationality' differs from one market to
another. As Peter Hall has written:
...the market setting in which entrepreneurs and workers
operate is a complex of interrelated institutions whose
character is historically determined and whose
configuration fundiedntally affects the incentives the
market actors face
Country-specific marke? structures interact with the general
tendencies of market operations outlined above to shape
business decisions in different countries. On the basis of
the peculiar reluctance of British employers to invest in
training, I want to suggest that the implementation of
successful training policy in Britain - based on the lessons
we have learnt up to now - is inextricably linked to more
fundamental reforms of its industrial and financial structure.
204 This is not to suggest that cultural variables are
unimportant for public policy. For example, a recent editorial in
the Times Educational Supplement said: "Beneath the systematic
failure of the present educational system is a set of cultural
values which deprives the majority of the population of the psychic
drive and ambition to stay the course and mount the ladder". See
'Mr Straw's Alternative' Times Educational Supplement 19th May 1989
p A18. It is interesting to note in this regard that the Labour
Party's recent policy review pledges to try and foster a "New
Educational Culture".
205 P.Hall Governing the Economy: The Politics of State
Intervention in Britain and France (Cambridge: Polity, 1986) p35
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In his book Governing the Economy, Peter Hall discusses
various explanations for poor British economic performance in
the period since 1945. Dismissing various attempts to find
one key to British economic decline (size of state,
macroeconomic policy, culture), he begins what he calls an
"institutional analysis" of the peculiarity of Britain's
social, political and economic structure. For our purposes it
is useful to highlight one feature of the British market noted
by Hall, namely the . sion between industrial and financial
capital, and the short-termism engendered by it206. Unless
this issue is properly tackled, thus 'completing the learning
curve' by linking general principles to national specificity,
the value of the lessons learnt up to now will be severely
attenuated.
It is now widely acknowledged that the perspectives of British
management are peculiar for their short term nature. From
research and development to training, British industry is
strangely reluctant to invest in projects that promise returns
in the long run, preferring instead to maximize short term
profits. As Dore reminds us, the stereotypical British
206 The other factors he notes are the shape of product markets
and the structure of industry over the last 100 years (specifically
the protected colonial markets and the enduring presence of small
suppliers); the impact on firm organization on performance (in
particular the failure to reap the benefits of conglomeration and
good management practice); and finally the structure of the labor
market (especially the defensive power of certain workers in
decentralized craft-based trade unions
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manager is concerned with the profit margin on a quarterly
basis while his/her Japanese counterpart is concerned above
all with the prospects for market share in five years time207.
Culturally-based risk aversion aside, in many people's eyes
this is a product of the financial pressures imposed on
British industry by the powerful financial markets. As Dore
says:
In Britain, the stock exchange is not the appendix or208
gall bladder of the body economic, but its very heart2
As Hall, Longstreth and Zysman all emphasize209 ,the historical
separation of financial and industrial capital in Britain -
dating from its unique industrialization process210 - has
contrived to divorce major sources of long term investment
funds from British industry. Neither shareholdings nor long
run loans link banks and firms: share prices reflect the short
term demands of 'hot' money flows, forcing excessively short
207 R.P.Dore 'Financial Structures and the Long Term View' pp
10-29 in Policy Studies Vol 6 No 1 (July 1985) pO
208 Dore Ibid p20
209 Hall Governing the Economy op cit p59; F.Longstreth 'The
City, Industry and the State' pp 157-190 in C.Crouch (ed) State
and Economy in Contemporary Capitalism (New York: St Martin's
Press, 1979) pp 160ff; J.Zysman Governments. Markets and Growth:
Financial Systems and the Politics of Industrial Chanae (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1983) pp 189ff
210 As Gerschenkron explains, Britain, the first
industrializer, was able to finance industrialization through the
internally generated revenue of commercial companies, and not have
to rely on bank or state funds as other countries did. See
'Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective' pp 5-30 in
A.Gerschenkron Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1962) pp 7ff
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term horizons on management in industry; and second, only 15-
20% of loans to British industry are for over one year, in
comparison to roughly 60% in France and Germany2 11. The
implications for investment in training are stark: the
decision-making calculus imposed on industry by the broader
financial system diverts funding away from long term
investment of which training is a prime example. Thus,
British governments face particular difficulties in corralling
employer cooperation in training programs.
The attenuation of this problem is clearly a prerequisite for
effective public use of private interest in Britain. Dore
suggests several ways in which the guiding rationale behind
current private interest can be redirected: most importantly,
they depend on the development of 'committed' shareholders
locked into long term relationships with firms21 2 . On this
basis, it is argued, managers could safely plan for the long
term without the 'exit' threat of uncommitted shareholders
hanging over them. Whether such policy development takes
place directly, through a British Investment Bank, as proposed
211 Zysman Governments p192
212 Dore 'Financial Structures' op cit pp 24ff
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by the Labour Party21 3, or indirectly, through for instance, an
interest subsidy, it is crucial that this aspect of British
peculiarity is tackled.
3.4 CONCLUSIONS
This thesis started by noting the peculiarly haphazard nature
of the transition from school to work for (primarily) working
class young people in Britain and the United States. After
thirty years of policy development, the two countries remain
peculiar (with regard to their systems of youth VET). In the
American case, what Walter Dean Burnham has called an
"incredible array of constitutional and legal devices",
designed to fragment political activity214 , combine to block
precisely the sort of integrated and systematic policy making
that we have highlighted as central to successful policy for
youth VET. The result, as we have seen, is a patchwork of
programs that are not just structurally weak, but also in
large part divorced from the mainstream of American economic
life.
213 See Meet the Challenge op cit p13. A similar option, the
National Enterprise Board, was supposed to be central to Labour's
industrial strategy in the 1970s, but never recovered from
underfunding and recession. See D.Coates Labour in Power (London:
Longman, 1980)
214 W.D.Burnham The Current Crisis in American Politics
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982) p9
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In Britain, on the other hand, executive power offers
government the necessary tools for policy coordination, and
Mrs Thatcher has taken advantage of the power offered to her.
Nonetheless, Britain remains underskilled after ten years of
Thatcherism: our study of her record teaches us that the
integration of youth policy with broader economic and social
policy raises as many questions as it answers.
Most importantly, the Thatcher experience forces a recognition
of the politics of youth policy. By this, I mean that
policies for the transition from school to work flow from and
reflect the political priorities and vision of decision-
makers. Most starkly, these policies either serve up working
class youth to the discipline of the market, or aim to
discipline the market in favor of social goals. Thus, policy-
makers must decide whether and at what age to separate
'academic' from 'ncn-academic' pupils; they must decide
whether the curriculum should be shaped by market or non-
market needs; they must decide whether to promote high skill
training for high wage jobs, or low wage training for work in
the secondary labor market; finally, they must decide whether
trade union cooperation should be sought at the expense of
market freedom. At every stage of the process, the practical
requirements of policy for youth VET force policy-makers to
reveal their view of the long term contribution of the working
population to society.
130
Despite their vastly different 'policy legacies', every
advanced industrialized country faces these questions. On the
basis of experience detailed in this thesis, we can offer
three ideal principles n which to base policy prescription
for the 1990s. First, youth policy cannot be divorced from
broader economic strategy, most obviously that pertaining to
job creation. Second, the long term public stake in effective
policy in this field equires government regulation of the
atomized decisions of individual players in the market.
Finally, the application of the first two principles must be
tempered by a sensitivity to the peculiar requirements of each
national context.
In the application of these principles, 'politics matters',
leaving the political process - and ideals competing within it
- to fashion the final contours of the transition from school
to work.
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APPENDIX 1
STANDARDISED RATES OF YOUTH UNEMPLOYMENT (%)
'84
39
39
27
30
22
'85 '86
38 36
39 38
- 25
32 33
22 23
'87
34
38
23
35
23
'88
29
37
20
34
25
* = Figures
+ = Figures
" = Figures
- = Figures
for under 25s
for 16-24 year
for 15-24 year
not available
(Source: OECD uarterly Labour Force Statistics)
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US +
FRG *
SWE +
JAP 
'80
47
46
27
42
22
'82
41
41
30
38
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'81
41
45
30
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22
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40
39
29
36
21
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APPENDIX 2
STANDARDISED RATES OF UNEMPLOYMENT
(as % of total labor force)
'82
11.3"
9.5
6.1
2.4
2.4
'83
12.4"
9.5
8.0
2.6
2.6
'84
11.7
7.4
7.1
2.7
2.7
'85
11.2
7.1
7.2
2.6
2.6
'86
11.2
6.9
6.4
2.8
2.8
*
'87
10.2
6.1
6.2
2.8
2.8
8.2" 7.4
10.5" 10.8
7.2
10.9
7.1" 6.8"
10.9" 10.7
* = Figures represent standardised OECD measurments of
unemployment
" = OECD estimates/preliminary figures
G7 = Group of Seven (countries), namely Canada, US, Japan,
France, West Germany, Italy, UK ~
EEC 7 = Belgium, France, Italy, Holland, Portugal, Spain, UK
(Source: OECD uarterly Labour Force Statistics)
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UK
US
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JAP
'80
6.4"
7.0
3.0
2.0
2.0
'81
9.8"
7.5
4.4
2.2
2.2
'88
8.3
5.4
6.2
2.5
2.5
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EEC
5.5"
6.4"7
6.4
8.2
7.78
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